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No RIGHT TO PERFORM A CONTRACT?
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ABsTRACT: This thesjs offers an alternative outlook on the decision of a contractual party to
reject the benefit of the contract when he is no longer interested in the other party’s perfor
mance It is an attempt to justify such course of action by challenging the proposition that one
is always entitled to perform one’s own contractual promises. This shall be done ia tbe context
of the controversial decision of flue House of Lords in White & Carter (Coundils) v McGregor
[1962} AC 413, a case where the insistent performer happened to be able to complete hjs part
of the contract without the need for his custome?s cooperation and even against his expres
sed will.
in a large number of cases the provider of a service wffl have no other interest iii actually
performing his part of the contract beyond that ofsecuring his right to the fuil contract price.
This thesis argues that whenever that is the case the courts should acknowledge both the service
recipient’s right to renounce the benefit of the contract and his power to prevent the unwanted
supply ofservices, whether bywords or conduct. The service provider who has been discharged
from bis duty to perform will be adequately protected so long as bis right to the fuil contract
price is not at stake. He has no need for a right to perform’ in its proper sense.
However, he shoúld not end up better off than he would have been had he actually perfor
med his part ofthe contract. Therefore, the abdicating party should be allowed to deduct from
the contract price by way of set-off whichever sums the former has saved or otherwise made as
a consequence of his early release.
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1 know who 1 was when 1 go: up this rnorning,
but 1 think 1 niust have changed severa! tirnes since then’
Peopie are often poor at predicting changes, both in external circumstan
ces and in their own personal preferences. Flence they rnust frequently come
to the conclusion that some of their past decisions have become obsolete. This
dissertation is about regret. More specifically, it is concerned with cases where
one contracting party loses ali interest in the other party’s performance after
a contract has been entered into but before it has been acted upon. 1 am par-
ticuiarly concerned with the contract for the supply of services (in a fairly
broad sense)2,and within that type of •contract 1 shail focus on the situation
where the abdicating party is the service recipient (R), rather than its provider
(P). 1 shali confine myself entirely to the case of the discrete commercial con
tract where the parties deal at arm’s length and are in need of no special pro
tection.
The origins of my interest in this topic lie in a general dissatisfaction with
the controversial decision of the House of Lords in White & Carter (Councils)
v McGregor3.Contrary to the vast majority ofits detractors, however, the focus
of rny dissatisfaction is not so rnuch the sheer waste of resources that it Ieads
to but rather the utter powerlessness of the defendant to prevent the other
party from performing his part ofthe contract. ‘Surely the conclusive questiõn
is not whether the performance is unwanted, but whether it is worthless’4,so
the argu’ment goes. 1 beg to differ In this dissertation 1 shalliook frito the legal
position of a party (R) who has lost ali interest in the services he has contrac
ted for, with a view to support the recognition of his right to reject and even
prevent the unwanted supply of services.
It is not my intention to question the binding force of wholly executory
contracts. Nor do 1 propose to promote the recognition of a power to unilate
rally rescind the contract (aside from cases of major breach), if only because
1 Alice’s repiy to the Caterpiiar. L Carroil Alice’s Adventures in Wonderiand in RL
Green (ed) The Works ofLewis Carroil (Spring Books London 1965) 50. Quoted in BA
Farnsworth C1-iangingyourMind: the 14w ofRegretted Decisions (Ya1eUP London New
Haven 1998) 26.
2 So, for instance., 1 wouid include iii rny notion ofsupply ofservices a .contract for
work and materiais but not a straightforward saie of goods.
3 [1962] AC 413 (HL).
4 EM Nienaber ‘The effe•ct of anticipatory repudiation: principie and policy’
[1962) CLJ 213, 233.
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any such recognition would dangerously undermine the entire institution of
contract as we know it. Quite on the contrary the une of argument that 1
intend to pursue is grounded ou the perception that it is conceptually viable
to hold that R rnaylawfully prevent P from performing his part ofthe contract
whilst keeping the contract alive.
1 shall begin my analysis of this problem by Iooking into the reasons why
prevention of another party’s performance — whether active or by omission —
is at present alrnost universally characterised as a breach of contract. At the
heart of this approach seems to be the suggestion, sometimes made, that the
cornmon law imposes on the parties to a contract a duty to cooperate in order
to facilitate the fulfilment of their bargain.5 Indeed, cooperation is by defini-
tion the antithesis ofprevention. Hence in Chapter One 1 shall be looking into
the origins of this so-called duty to cooperate and to the process by which the
courts have come to imply it in order to discern where things might have gone
astray.
When faced with the situation under analysis, the courts tend to favour
performance for the sake of performance alone, never pausing to ask exactly
whose contractual interest is at stake in each particular factual situation. By
focusing on cthe bargain’, rather than the parties’ mutual promises, the duty
based approach to cooperation takes for granted that each party has an unfet
tered right to perform his own part of the contract free from interference,
overlooking the possibility that such a right might in fact not have been inten
ded at ali by the parties themselves. This attitude grants the contract a sort of
autonomous life ofits own, in that the parties are treated as ifthey were bound
to fulfil jt rather than each other’s reasonable expectations.
My objective at this stage is to take a purposive approach to contractual
interpretation and concentrate on the parties’ reasonable expectations as to
the outcome ofthe contractual undertaking. Although references in legal wri
tings to the spirit of’the deal’, the common purpose of ‘the transaction’ or the
duty to fadiitate fulfilment of ‘the bargain’ are exceedingly common, the fact
5 See F Poliock Principies ofContract (9th edn Stevens & Sons London 1921) 294;
EW Patterson cCoisttie conditions in contracts’ (1942) 42 ColLRev 903; SJ Stol
jar ‘Prevention and cooperation in the law of contract’ (1953) 3 1 CanBarRev 23 1; AJ
Bateson ‘The duty to cooperate’ [1960) JBL 187; JF Burrows ‘Contractual cooperation
and the irnpiied terrn’ (1968) 31 MLR 390; H Coilins The Law of Contract (3rd edn
Butterworths London 1997) Ch 15; JM Paterson ‘Terms irnplied in fact: the basis for
implication’ (1998) 13 JCL 103; HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts (28th edn Sweet &
Maxweli London 1999) 13-011 and 13-012; AF Mason ‘Contract, good faith and
equitable standards in fttir deaiing’ [2000] 1 16 LQR 66; E Peden C “Cooperation” in
English contract iaw — to construe or imply?’ (2000) 16 JCL 56.
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remains that the typical executory contract — if there is such a thing as a typi
cal executory contract — is an exchange of promises, each made for the sole
benefit of its promisee. Each party to the contract will have purchased, with
his own prornise, a right to dernand performance of the counter-promise —
nothing more, nothing less. A purposive approach to construction, whilst
potentially requiring a certain degree of cooperation to take place during per
formance of the contract, wffl clearly not promote a vision of contract as a
cooperative venture, to the exclusion of a party’s individual best interest.
Bearing this in mmd, 1 shall attempt to expiam how the traditional pro
rnissory approach to cooperation originated in an improper overgeneraliza
tion of authority that gave rise to an unsuitably framed rule of construction.6
1 shall analyse leading cases such as Mackay v Dick,7where the courts felt com-
pelled to imply a duty to cooperate even though the outcome of those cases
could ultimately have been reached by a different and more suitable rationale.
1 hope to demonstrate that such implication was neither necessary nor reaso
nable.
The central aim of this chapter is therefore to put forward that, whereas
each contractual party lias a duty to cooperate so as not to frustrate the other
party’s legitimate expectations, when it comes to his own legitimate expecta
tions that party is merely faced with a choice between two alternative courses
of action, both of which are lawful: either to cooperate and fulfil these expec
tatjons, or not to cooperate and suffer the consequences of bis own lack of
cooperation. Thus, 1 conclude this chapter by contending that the concept of
a ‘burden rather than that of a duty, better encapsulates the true meaning
of the require.ment of cooperation as to the latter type of expectations.
Having thus paved the way for the submission that there are other ways of
taking a contractual risk beyond’the making of a promise, 1 shall begin Chap—
ter Two by tackling the issue ofcontractual risk-allocation itself, concentrating
on those instances of risk bearing that go beyond the scope of the contractual
promises, that is, on those situations where loss was sustained even though no
breach was committed and no liability arose. My main intention in this chap
ter is, however, to explore the possibility of finding an alternative conceptual
framework for the requirement of cooperation in its characterisation as a con
tingent condition subsequent to P’s duty to perform.
6 Jt is one ofthe misfortunes ofthe law that ideas become encysted in phrases and
thereafter for a Iong time cease to provoke further analysis Hyde and Schneider v Uni-
ted States ( 191 1 ) 225 US 347 (Mr Justice Holmes) 391.
7 (i88) 6 App Cas 251 (HL).
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Indeed, it seems perfectly plausible that someone should wish to secure a
contractual right to a given service, without at the sarne time prornising that
he wilI accept it when it becornes due. 1 shall subrnit that, even though R must
generally bear the risk of iosing interest in the services he has contracted for,
it does not inexorably foliow that he must endure them, inasmuch as his obli
gations towards P do not go beyond assuring that his legitimate contractual
expectations are adequately met. By way of illustration, when R buys a
cinema ticket he normally does not intend to bind himself to turn up at the
right time and sit attentively through the whole fim. He is satisfied that he
wilI have fulfihled ali his contractual obligations by paying the price and —
should he decide to turn up — not littering the theatre nor being a nuisance
to the others present.
1 must deal with P’s alleged right to earn the fuil contract price, for this
appears to be the main obstacle to the recognition of R’s right to prevent
P from performing Indeed, as long as one sustains the view that by preven
ting P from performing R will also be preventing him from earning the right
to the fali contract price, there is no way of contending that R should be recog
nised such a power, for its exercise would automatically injure P’s legitimate
contractual expectations. Therefore 1 shall try to do away with this conception
and also reject the proposition that a promisor has an unfettered right to per
form his promise. 1 shall argue that such right should be recognised only
where it was (explicitly or more commonly implicitly) bargained for at the
time of contracting.
When construing a contract one must start by enquiring what exactly each
party has bargained for, and the exact scope of the rights and duties which
they have agreed. In the situation under analysis, two alternative end results
seem equally plausible: either (a) R’s cooperation is rnandatory, in which case
P’s right to the contract price can be made conditional upon his agreed supply
of services; or (b) it is discretionary, in which case P’s right to the contract
price cannot depend on the actual rendering of his services to R. The tradi
tional approach to construction is flawed by a form of dogmatic reasoning, in
that it takes for granted that P’s right to the fuil contract price is always con
ditional upon bis actual supply of services, thereby faiing to recognise the
need for such an enquiry, since only (a) matches such an assumption.
The main purpose of this chapter is therefore to show that, whilst it can
be said that P’s right to the fuli contract price is conditional upon due per
formance of his part of the contract, it does not necessarily follow that it is
conclitional upon the actual rendering ofhis services to R, insofar as, should




Whereas from P’s standpoint it may be enough to regard his own supply
of services as conditional upon R’s cooperation, what the latter really needs is
recognition of his right to renounce P’s performance. Indeed, such recogni
tion is absolutely essential if we are to extend this solution to cases where no
cooperation is needed for P to perforrn his part of the contract. Therefore,
1 shall proceed in Chapter Three to advocate the recognition of a general right
to renounce one’s own contractual rights as long as one has performed or is
wiliing to perform one’s own duties under the contract.
1 shall begin this chapter by going through the doctrine of anticipatory
breach of contract in order to make clear why it is inapplicable to the problem
under scrutiny. It is my submission that one should look at prevention
without automatically characterising it as a breach of contract in the shape
of a repudiation, and that even in the presence of an unambiguous repudia-
tion (which, if unaccepted, should be ‘a thing writ in water’8), insofar as the
contract remains in force, the subject of R’s entitlement to reject and prevent
P’s performance should be dealt with as something entirely separate from that
of the futility of his attempted termination.
Hence the question that should be asked is, once again, whether in each
particular factual situation P has bargained for the right to perfor.m his part
of the contract, and only when he has should one ask whether it has been
improperly exercised. If he has not, however, it is my subrnission that R
should be recognised the right to reject and even prevent P from perfor
ming. 1 shall contend that all R must do is let P know that he no longer has
an interest in his performance, and performance of that particular promise
ceases to be legally possible, because whichever course ofaction P decides to
take his conduct will no longer be susceptible of being characterised as that
promise’s performance. 1 shall cail this purely conceptual remedy ‘preven
tion by notification’. Should P decide to ‘perform’ against R’s will he wffl be
doing so at his own risk, and may even be held liable for whatever harm the
latter may come to suifer as a consequence ofbis conduct. Depending on the
consequences of such conduct, P’s insistence on ‘performance’ after R’s re
nunciation might properly be characterised as a breach of contract or even
as a breach of a duty of care towards R.
In Chapter Four 1 shall explore the possibility of allowing R to set off
against his payment of the fuil contract price any expense that P might have
saved and any proflt that he might have made as a result of his release from
the obligation to supply his services. Ai the outset this amounts to an appli
cation of the doctrine of mitigation in fa’ct, since the question here is not
8 Howard v Pickford Tool Co f1951j 1(13 417 (CA) 421 (Asquith LJ).
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whether P is ‘bound’ to mitigate his loss but whether his loss was in fact
niitigated due to his early discharge. 1 shall discuss the reasons why the doc
trine of mitigation should apply to this case even though P is prima facie
asking for the fuil contract price rather than for an award of darnages for
breach of contract.
Essentially, 1 shali submit that in this case there is an element of compen
sation in P’s rernedy, given that the award ofthe contract price is aimed at put
ting him in the position he wouid have been in had he duly suppiied his ser-
vices to R, rather than at rewarding him for the actual performance of those
services. Therefore, the expectation measure becomes reievant, and so does
the concept ofloss (or the lack thereof). Conversely, whenever such savings do
not occur due to P’s insisting ‘perforrnanc&, the question is primarily one of
characterisation: whatever he failed to save must not be taken into account —
it must not be characterised as constituting an expense in any way relat.ed to
performance of his contractual obligations. He shall have to bear that loss
himself. In addition, whenever his conduct in attempting to ‘perforrn’ is
unlawful, he shall have to compensate R for any Ioss his ‘performance’ might
have caused him.
CHAPTER 1
TRE PROMISSORY APPROACH TO COOPERATION
A. A DUTY TO COOPERATE?
Tt is often said that the law of contract’s main purpose is to create an envi
ronment where individuais are abie and encouraged to maximise their own
utilities through the means of cooperation. The word ‘cooperation’ is being
used here in its strictest possible sense, meaning necessary coordination in the
pursuit of self-interest. In most transactions, it would appear that such coo-
peration simply requires performance to take place according to what was
expressiy agreed by the parties. And that wil happen largely as a result of the
econornic or other self-interest that led them into entering the transaction in
the first piace. Hence a shopkeeper will hand over the goods in exchange for
payment by the custorner; and a rnechani.c wii fix the ciient’s car, being paid
in return for this service once it has been cornpieted.
English contract iaw traditionally iimited its intervention to upholding
express agreements and setting the conditions under which one party might
15
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terminate a contract in the face of a breach by the other.9 This traditional
approach to contract law — which today still exerts a consideraMe amount of
influence amongst both practitioners and academics — is firmiy grounded on
an antagonistic conception of the business of contracting. Underiying ii is an
adversarial model where each contracting party seeks to maximise its utiity in
the context of tough negotiation, and where the resulting contract is regarded
as a combination of their fundamentally opposing selflsh interests. In its
purity, this approach essentially postulates that the contract must be perfor
med in accordance with what has been strictly agreed upon at the time of con
tracting and that beyond that the parties need not worry about each other’s
best interest Imposition of additional duties of cooperation not only appea
red unnecessary but also threatened to breach the principie that the parties
must consent to ali contractual obligations.
Eventually, it became apparent that such an insular approach to construc
tion was grossly inadequate, and couid be the source ofgreat injustice.’° For
no matter what the particular circumstances ofa case may be, there are usually
ways of evading the spirit of a deal whilst externally following the express
terms of the contract to the very letter.11 Towards the mid l9th century, the
courts slowly began to adhere to the idea that the parties to a contract might
be under an obligation not to hinder each other from performing their part of
the 12 Or that where a contract was made subject to a condition pre
9 See H Coilins The Law ofContract (3rd edn Butterworths London 1997) Ch 15.
lo For instance, in Morris v Lutterel(1599) Cro Eliz 672; 78 ER 910, an early action
on a penal bond conditioned for the payment of £100 on a certain day, the fact that
the claimant covinously caused the defendant to be imprisoned while he was on his
way to make the payment did not forfeit his duty to pay the penalty. See, however, SJ
Stoljar ‘Prevention and co-operation in the law ofcontract’ (1953) 31 CanBarRev 231,
234, where the author puts forward his differing views on the correct interpretation of
this and other similar early cases.
1 1 See Secretary of State for Employment v Associated Society of Locomotive Engi
neers and Fireman (No 2) [ 19721 2 QB 455 (CA) for an enlightened reaction to the
Ck to rule’ situation in the context of an employment contract.
12 cThere is an implied contract by each party that he will not do anything to pre
vent the other party from perforrning the contract or to delay Mm in performing it.
1 agree that generally such a term is by law imported unto every contract Barque Quil
pué Ltd v Brown [1904] 2 KB 264 (CA) 271. See also Stirling v Maitland (1864) 5 B&S
840, 852; Rhodes v Forwood (1876) 1 App Cas 256 (HL) 272, 274; Turner v Goldsrnith
[1891] 1 QB 544 (CA); Ogdens Ltd v Nelson [19051 AC 109 (HL); Southern Foundries v
Shirlaw [1940] AC 701 (HL); William Cory & Son Ltd v City ofLondon Corp [1951j 2 KB
476 (CA) 484; Hamson & Son v S Martin Johnson á Co [1953] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 553; Shin
dier v Northern Raincoat Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 1038; The Unique Mariner (No 2) [1979] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 37; Tredegariron á Coal Co v Hawthorn Bros & Co (1902) 18 TLR 716 (CA).
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cedent — apparently whether promissory or merely contingent — it might be
their duty to do nothing to hinder its fulfflment.13Such is the so-called nega-
tive side of the duty to cooperate. Eventually, they also carne to recognise the
existence of a contractual duty to cooperate actively in order to help the other
party perforrn his part of the contract, where such cooperation was necessary
to complete it. Thus Lord Blackburn, in Mackay v Dick14,stated that
where in a written contract it appears that both parties have agreed that something
shail be done, which cannot effectually be done unless both concur in doing it, the
construction of the contract is that each agrees to do ali that is necessary to be
done on his part for the carrying out ofthat thing, though there may be nõ express
words to that effect.15
From that mornent onwards) the courts have persistently (if not always
consistently) adopted Lord Blackburn’s dictum, treating this as a matter of
construction: a duty to cooperate, being generally not expressly provided for,
would usually be implied where it was ‘necessary to give business efficacy to
the contract’16,that is, where it was called for by the commercial purpose of
the transaction.17This technique allowed the courts to contend that both the
13 See Inchbald v Western Neilgherry Coffee. etc, Co (1864) 17 CB (NS) 733, 741;
Roberts v Bury Improvements Commissioners (1870) LR 5 CP 310, 316, 325; Mackay v
Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251 (HL); Hickman á Co v Roberts [1913] AC 229 (HL); George
Troilope eb Sons v Martyn Bros [1934] 2 KB 436 (CA); Bournemouth & Boscombe Ath
letic FC v Manchester United FCThe Tirnes May 22 1980 (CA); Jebco Properties v Mas-
tforce Ltd [1992) NPC 42.
14 (1881) 6 App Cas 251 (HL). Note that this was an appeal from a Scottish case.
15 Sarne case 263. See also Hunt v Bishop (1853) 8 Exch 675; 155 ER 1523; Roberts
v Bury Improvements Cornrnissioners (1870) LR 5 CP 310, 316, 325; Nelson v Dahl
(1879) 12 ChD 568 (CA) 592; affd (1881) 6 AC 38 (HL).
16 See Bowen LJ’s definition of the ‘business efficacy’ test in The Moorcock (1889)
14 PD 64 (CA) 68 and also MacKinnon LJ’s definition of the alternative ‘officious
bystander’ test in Shirlaw v Southern Foundries [1939) 2 KB 206 (CA) 227.
17 See Sprague v Booth [1909] AC 576 (PC) 580; Kleinert v Abosso Gold Mining Co
(1913) 58 SJ (PC) 45; Harrison v Walker [1919] 2 KB 453; Colley v Overseas Exporters
[1921] 3 KB 302, 309; Panameía Europea Navegación v Frederick Leyland & Co [1947]
AC 428 (HL) 436; Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108 (HL) 1 18; Mona Ou
Equipment v Rhodesia Railways Ltd [1949] 2 Mi ER 1014, 1017-8; Pound (AV) & Co v
MWHardy & Co [1956] AC 588 (HL) 608, 611; Sociedad Financiera de Bienes Raíces
v Agrirnpex (The .Aello) [1961] AC 135 (HL) 186, 220; Sunheam Shipping Co v Presi
dent ofindia [ 1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 482 486; Schindler v Pigault (1975) 30 P&CR 328;
Metro Meat Ltd v Fares Rural Co Pty [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 13 (PC) 14; Merton London
BC v Stanley Hugh Leach (1985) 32 BuildLR 51; Thornpson v Asda-MFI Group plc
(1988] Ch 241, 266; Kurt A Becher v Roplak Enterprises SA (The World Navigator)
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existence, in any given case, of an actual duty to cooperate and the degree of
cooperation required were to be determined, not by what seemed reasonable,
but by what they perceived to be the unexpressed intentjon of the parties to
the contract — which rneant that the principie of consent rernained formally
unchallenged.
The courts have repeatedly felt the need to adopt a more purposive approach
to construction. The comrnon iaw being averse to broad overriding principies
such as that of good faith but favouring the adoption of piecerneal solutions
in. response to demonstrated probiems of unfairness18,they have accomplis
hed it by resorting to the technical device of the implied term — where coope—
ration is necessary, it is implied that it will be forthcoming. This general rule
of construction is ultirnately an abstraction that requires taioring to the facts
of the particular factual situation and the needs of the particular parties in
order to acquire any specific content, giving rise to individual and concrete
duties to cooperate. When deterrnining their scope the courts hide behind
a façade: that of the parties’ unexpressed intention. They do this through the
requirement of necessity.
The reasoning followed is fairly simple, and seerningly flawless: sureiy the
parties to a contract must have wanted it to be ftilly and efficientiy performed,
50 they must have intended to cooperate whenever such cooperation is essen
tial to the fuil realisation oftheir bargain. Where cooperation is necessary, it is
implied that it wil be forthcoming.’9In other words, if the parties want x to
take place and in order for that to happen y must take place too, it is implied
that it is their duty to make y happen as well. Thus — so the story goes — a man
who engages an artist to paint his portrait implicitly promises that he will give
the necessary sittings.
B. PROT.ECTING THE PARTIES’ REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
During the 2Oth century, this somewhat restrictive view was challenged by
occasional suggestions that the courts should imply terms as iong as they were
[1991] 2 Lioyd’s Rep 23, 30, 34; Davy Offshore v Ernerald Field Contracting(1991) 27
ConstLR 138 (CÁ); Nissho Iwai Petroleum v Cargili International SA [ 1993) 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 80, 84; Autornotive Patterns (Precision Equipment) Ltd v A W Plurne Ltd (CA 30
October .1996); North Sea Energy Holdings v Petroleum Authority of Thailand [1999] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 483 (CÁ) 492.
18 See Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes [1989] QB 433 (CA)
439 (Bingham LJ).
19 Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108 (HL) 118 (Viscount Simon LC).
18
NO RIGHT TO PERFORM A CONTRACT?
reasonable.2°And in certain specific types of contract some implied terms
have since become standardised, and will now be implied in all contracts of
that type in the absence of any contrary intention These terms are often said
to be implied in law, as opposed to the former which are irnplied in fact.21
Thus terms are frequently implied into contracts of employment and tenan
cies, not on the basis of the circumstances of the particular parties, but as a
general incidence of the relationship of employer and employee or landlord
and tenant.
This process of decision is quite ndependent ofthe intention ofthe parties
except that they are normally free, by using express words, to exclude the
terms which would otherwise be implied. Consequently — as the House of
Lords has recently acknowledged — a distinction should be drawn ‘between the
search for an implied term necessary to give business efficacy to a particular
contract and the search, based on wider considerations, for a term which the
law wiIl imply as a necessary incident of a definable category of contractual
reiationship.’22
This somewhat broader power to imply terms is said to be confined in
two ways: firstly, the transaction has to fali within one of the recognised
standard types of contract; secondly, its use wilI be limited to terms which
would generally be applicable to the relevant standard type of contract.23
As a result, whilst such wid.er considerations have allowed courts to mpose
certain duties of cooperation in the context of tenancies or employment
contracts, this recent development of the law would appear, on the surface,
not to have had •a tremendous impact on the general attitude of the law
20 See Lord .Denning MR’S judgments in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [ 1976] QB
319 (CA) and in Shell UK v Lostock Garage [1976j 1 WLR 1187 (CA).
21 See GH Treitel The Law ofContract (lOth edn Sweet & Maxwell London 1999)
183-95; JF Burrows ‘Contractual co-operation and the implied term’ (1968) 31 MLR
390 and ‘Implied terms and presumptions’ (1968) NZULRev 121; ABL Phang
cIlid terms revisited’ [ 1990] JBL 394, ‘Implied terms in English law — some recent
developments’ [1993] JBL 242 and ‘Jmplied terrns again’ [1994] JBL 255; JW Carter
and Gj Toffiurst ‘The newlaw on implied terms’ (1996) 11 JCL 76 and cIplid terms:
refining the law’ (1997) 12 JCL 152; JM Paterson ‘Terms irnplied in fact: the basis for
irnplicaton’ (1998) 13 JCL 103.
22 Scally v Southern Health & Social Services Board {1992j 1 AC 294 (HL) 307
(Lord Bridge). His Lordsbip grounded this statement on two earlier decisions of the
House ofLords: Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co [1957] AC 555 and Liverpool
City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239. For the distinction between the two processes, see
also Mosvolds Rederj AIS v Food Corp ofindia [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68, 70-71 and Ali
Shipping Corp v Shipyard Trogir [1998] 2 All ER 136 (CA) 146-147.
23 H Coffins The Law ofContract (3rd edn Butterworths London 1997) 225-226.
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of contract towards the requirement of cooperation in the context of com—
mercial transactions.
One cannot however be so naïve as to believe that there is such a dear-cut
distinction between terms irnplied in fact and terms implied in law. This is
partly due to the fact that there has always been a certain arnbiguity in the way
that the courts treat the concept of presumed intent. For construing a con
tractual term based on what the parties probably would have intended is not
the sarne as giving effect to what the parties actually did intend.
Mi implied term based on the parties’ presumed actual intentions wouid be an
atternpt to express the intentions the parties probably actually held but did not
bother to express. An implied term based on the parties’ hypothetical intentions
would be au atternpt to approximate the term the parties would probabiy have
agreed if they had considered the issue in dispute when making their contract.
Judicial views are not entirely settled, or consistent, on which of these two mea
nings ofpresumed intent should govern.24
According to Glanvifie Wffliams, referrin.g to these two kinds of implica-
tion and to the implication of terms in law, calffiough the lime between the
three cases can be made sharp as a matter of definition, in practice they merge
imperceptibly unto each other, because the distinguishing factor, that of pro
bable intent, is a matter ofdegree.’25Indeed, in the words ofJF Burrows, ‘{tjhe
«implied terrn” area is best viewed as a descending scale, rather than as divi
ded into two, or even three ccc1asses)26
So whilst what the courts have been saying is that outside those terms
which have now become standardised it is the parties alone who can impose
a duty to cooperate, and that consequently it is their duty to scrutinise each
case closely for indications of their intention, such statements cannot be
taken at face value. It is difficult enough to discover the actual intention of
an individual, Iet alone the common intention of the parties to a contract,
on a rnatter that they probably never even considerei ‘The fact that a term
seems necessary or obvious once a dispute has arisen does not mean that
the term was actually intended by the parties at the time the contract was
24 JM Paterson ‘Terrns impiied in fact: the basis for implication’ ( 1998) 13 JCL
103, 107.
25 GL Wffliarns ‘Language and the law — IV’ [1945] 61 LQR 384, 401.
26 JF Burrows ‘I1d terrns and presumptions’ (1968) NZULRev 121, 140 n 85.
See Lord Wilberforc&s reference to a continuous spectrum’ in Liverpool CC v Irwin
[1977j AC 239 (HL) 254.
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made, although it may be a good approximation of the parties’ hypothetical
intentiOflS’27
At the end of the day, it is the courts that are imposing their own views of
what the parties ought to have intended. which is why their outward deference
to the parties’ intentions has been criticised by a number of commentators —
as well as quite a few judges — as a misleading fiction. Thus, almost fiftyr years
ago — albeit in the special context of the law of frustration — Lord Radcliffe
declared that
[b]y this time it might seem that the parties themselves have become so far
disembodied spirits that their actual persons should be allowed to rest in peace. In
their place there arises the figure of the fair and reasonabie man. And the spokes
person of the fair and reasonable man, who represents after all no more than the
anthropomorphic conception ofjustice, is and must be the court itself.28
Indeed, the justification for implied terms rests ultimately not on the
intentions of the parties themselves but rather on the court’s view of what
their reasonable expectations are likely to have been29,that is, it rests on what
the court perceives to be the typical expectations oftypical parties to the type
of contract under scrutiny. Without them one party would be prevented from
obtaining the fuil value of his expectation under the contract because the
other party insists upon limiting bis obligations to a strict interpretation ofthe
express terms of the contract. This is why the implication of individual duties
to cooperate is above aU else a means of protecting the parties’ reasonable
expectations as to their contract.
c. HIDDEN ASSUMPTIONS
The general rule of construction itself seerns unimpeachable: when coo-
peration is necessary, it is implied that it will be forthcoming. But when is
cooperation truly necessary? In the first place, what exactly is meant by the
requirement ofCit)? To begin with, that requirement clearly does not
concern physical necessity, sornething that calis for a mere inference of cau
sation in fact, rather than a principled evaluation of the fairness or justice
of the implication. The problem is definitely not one of ‘inevitable infe
27 JM Paterson CT impiied in fact: the basis for implicaton’ (1998) 13 JCL
103, 108.
28 Davis Contractors Ltd v Farnham UDC [1956] AC 696 (HL) 728.
29 See H Coilins The Law of Contract (3rd edn Butterworths London 1997) 228.
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rence’30 Hence even though the courts still insist that [tjhe touchstone is
always necessity and not mereiy reasonableness’31,in practice both concepts
are inextricably intertwined.
In Liverpool City Councjl v Irwin32,the leading case on the requirement of
necessity, the House of Lords held that it was an implied term of a lease of a
maisonette in a Council block that the landlord should take reasonable care to
keep the common parts ofthe block in a reasonable state ofrepair. And yet, in
Atiyah’s words
[ijt is not necessary to have lifts in blocks of flats ten stories high, though it
would no doubt be exceedingly inconvenient not to have them. So necessary really
means reasonably necessary, and that must mean reasonabiy necessary having
regard to the context and the price. So in the end there does not seem to be rnuch
difference between what is necessary and what is reasonable33
Moreover, when applying the general rale of construction to a case, the
courts surreptitiously tie thernselves to a number of assumptions, .allegedly in
the course of ascertaining the parties’ unexpressed intention.34 The biggest
assumption of ali sterns from their focusing their attention on ‘the bargain’,
rather than the pàrties’ mutual promises. The probiem with such an approach
is that it takes for granted that both parties wil have bargained for one and the
sarne end result, so that each of them must be recognised an unfettered right
to perform his own part of the deal free from interference — the negative side
of cooperation — and even a right to dernand each other’s help whenever such
help is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish that end resuit — the posi
tive side of cooperation. In short, the courts start by assurning that both par-
30 See GP Costigan The Performance ofContract: a Surnmary ofConditions in Con
tracts and Irnpossibility ofPerformance (TH Flood Chicago 1911) 10.
31 Liverpool CC v Irwin 11977j AC 239 (HL) 266 (Lord Edmund-Davies).
32 [1977] AC 239 (HL).
33 PS Atiyáh An Introduction to the Law ofContract (5th edn OUP Oxford 1995)
207. For anoffier illustration of this phenomenon see The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64
(CA) itself, where the implication was, to a certain extent, based on objective criteria
ofreasonableness in defining the precise extent ofthe implication. See GH Treitel The
Law ofContract (lOth edn Sweet & Maxwell London 1999) 193-4.
34 See JF Burrows ‘lmplied terrns and presumptions’ (1968) NZULRev 121 for
an analysis ofthe irnplied term technique in terms ofinitial presurnptions and their
rehuttal. It is submitted .that the author ofthis article rnay actually be aliuding to the
concept of defauit rules — which by definitjon involve a favourable aliocation of
the burden of proof to those who wish to stick to thern — rather than that of pre
surnptions.
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ties want the exact sarne end result to materialise, and thdn they proceed to
assume that the parties by their contract have bound thernseives to achieve it.
This approach blatantiy overlooks the chance that at ieast in some cases
such rights rnight in fact not have been inte.nded at ali by the contractual par-
ties thernselves. It grants the contract a sort of autonornous life of jts own, in
that the parties are treated as if they were bound to fulfil ‘it’, rather than each
other’s reasonable expectations But the ciassical rnodel of English contract
law is that of a bargain, and a bargain postulates an exchange — an exchange of
prorniseS, in the case ofthe bilateral executory contract. A purposive approach
to construction therefore postuiates that one Iooks at a contract as what it
truly is — an exchange ofprornises. Each contractual party wffl have bargained
for whatever the other party has prornised to do .(or abstain from doing). As a
result their own individual expectations rnust necessarily be different from the
other party’s, and rnust therefore be treated accordingly.
An example ofthis sort ofrnisconceived reasoning maybe found in the foi-
lowing words: ‘The basic criterion of the irnplied-in-fact condition is that if
the prornise cannot be perforrned until the promisee has done sornething,
then that act or ornission is a condition of.the prornisor’s duty35 So far, so
good. in other words, the promisee is required to co-operate with the promi
sor in the performance ofhis prornise’36How come? There is an unwarranted
logical ieap in this reasoning, inasmuch as from the recognition that the pro
misor’s duty to perform is conditional upon the prornisee’s active or passive
cooperation it does not necessarily follow that the Iatter has bound himself to
cooperate. There are other ways — over and above the making of a promise —
ofbringing about a certain desired action by another person.37
In short, the courts’ main assumptions are: (a) the parties have an unfette
red right to perform their part of the deal free frorn interference — the nega-
tive side of cooperation; (b) the parties are bound to accompiish one and the
sarne end result, 50 they must also be bound to do whatever it takes to accom
plish that end result — the positive side of cooperation. But these assumptions
should be openly acknowledged and justified by the courts. The courts should
admit they are making them in the first place, rather than hide behind words
like ‘intention’ and city And they should give good reasons for rnaking
these assumptions. Why shoul.d they start off with the undisputed belief that
cooperation is a duty unless otherwise stated?
35 EW Patterson ‘Constructive conditions iii contract’ (1942) 42 ColLRev 903, 929.
36 Sarne article sarne page, text irnmediateiy following.




The decisions dealing with the estate agent’s conimission offer a good ilius
tration of the problem under scrutny. lii Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper8,
the claimant’s right to commission was subject to the conclusion of a saie to
purchasers introduced by him. He sued for breach of an alleged irnplied term
that the defendants would do nothing to prevent him from earning his com-
mission He failed.
The owner is offering to the agent a reward ifthe agent’s activity helps to bring
about an actual saie, but that is no reason why the owner should not remam free
to seil his propertythrough other channels. . . . 1 think, upon the true construction
pf the express contract in this case, that the agent aiso takes the risk of the owner
not being willing to conciude the bargain with the agent’s nominee. . . If it really
were the common intention of owner and agent that the owner should be bound
in the manner suggested, there would be no difficulty in so providing by an ex-
press terrn of the contract. But in the absence of such an express term, 1 am una-
ble to regard the suggested impiied term as necessary39
The approach of the House of Lords was unequivocally on implied term
lines. However, although the language of necessity was resorted to, and the
decision was allegedly based on the particular circumstances of the case, what
truly happened was that a term usually implied in law was altered — to its exact
opposite, in fact — so that a distinct default rule was henceforth adopted. The
decision ofthe Court ofAppeal in George Troilope t Sons v Martyn Bros0was
overruled, and from then on Luxor was applied in every case that concerned
an estate agent’s commission in order to substantiate the conclusion that no
such dutyèxists.
Through the implication ofterms the courts can structure contracts so that
they incorporate a fair and practical allocation of risks, a view that may alter
over time. In the Luxor case, it did. The fact is that in most cases involving
implied terms the law provides a clear prima facie answer to the problem — a
default solution — and one of the parties is asking the court to imply a term
that goes against this normal answer. There is nothing intrinsically wrong
with that.41 However, the problem is that in some of those cases rather than
38 [1941] AC 108 (HL).
39 Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108 (HL) 117-118 (Viscount Si-
mon LC).
40 [1934] 2 KB 436 (CA).
41 In fact, in those cases where there is no initial default rule the officious bystan
der test usually makes no sense, as in Troilope e Colis v North West Metropolitan Regio
nal Hospital Board [1973] 1 WLR 601 (HL). In this case, even though both parties
accepted that some term shouid be impiied — for the contract, as it stood, was unwork
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a default rule that can easily be overcorne by contrary evidence the courts
place a very harsh burden on one ofthe parties: to prevail over unacknowled
ged and unjustified assumptions that are virtually impossible to rebut, insofar
as, to a large extent, they are unconscious. This is what happens in the case of
cooperation. It involves an initial assumption that the parties have bound
themselves to do whatever it takes to complete their contract. It is by no means
a necessary assumption. Is it a reasonable one?
D. AN IMPROPER OVERGENERALISATION OF AUTHORITY
Let us return to Mackay v Dick2, a case that concerned the proper cons
truction of a contract for the saie of an excavating machine. In the early stages
of Lord Biackburn’s judgment, the force of his argument was that where coo-
peration is necessary, it is implied that it will be forthcoming. However, Lord
Blackburn went on to say that
{tjhe defender, having had the machine delivered to him, was by his contract
to keep it, unless on a fair test according to the contract it failed to do the stipu
lated quantity of work, in which case he would be entitled to cail on the pursuers
to remove it. And by his own default he can now never be in a position to cail upon
the pursuers to take back the machine on the ground that the test had not been
satisfied, he must, as far as regards that, keep, and consequentiy pay for it.43
So even though the principie enunciated by Lord Biackburn has Iaid the
foundations of the promissory approach to cooperation, in his analysis of the
facts of the case there is no mention of prevention whatsoever. ‘In his reaso
ning there was no question of the buyer preventing the sellers from claiming
payment. He prevented himself from escaping from the liabiity to pay.’44
The inclusion in the contract of a term providing for the testing of the
machine was obviously in the sellers’ best interest, insofar as for them it was
abie — such implication was destined to fail because there were a number of different
ways in which the clause might be varied so as to provide for the event of the com-
pietion ofphase 1 being deiayed. Where there is no initiai defauit solution, the test of
necessity makes no sense. The test is quite inappropriate when the question before the
court may be answered in any one of a number of alternative ways, and none of those
ways is a clear prima facie choice. See JF Burrows ‘Jmplied terrns and presumptions’
(1968) NZULRev 121. See n 26 above.
42 (1881) 6 App Cas 251 (HL).
43 Sarne case 264.
44 Mona OilEquipment v Rhodesia Railways 1949] 2 AU ER 1014, 1018 (Devlin J).
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highly advantageous ‘to have the question, whether it was or was not con
forrn to contract, determined by reference to a simple and definite test, ins
tead ofbeing Ieft to th•e uncertainty of speculative opinion, aggravated by the
risk oflitigation.’45However, once agreed to, that term was technically for the
benefit of the buyer, who was required to cooperate in order to take advan
tage ofit. He did not cooperate, hence was not entitied to the benefit ofretur
ning the machine. ‘[T]he saie and delivery of the machine must in Mackay
1’ Dick be deemed to have been complete, and payrnent of the price was the
refore subject oniy to the “resoiutive condition” imposed by the clause as to
the test.’46
By faiing to allow the testing ofthe machine to occur, the buyer was not in
breach of contract, inasmuch as his conduct was .of no consequence to the sei-
Iers whatsoever. They had not bargained for a right to demand performance
ofthe test, why should they? The buyer was the only one who stood to gain by
allowing the test to take place.
The duty to cooperate is imposed only for the puxpose of giving fuil effect to
the contract. Accordingiy a party does not infringe the duty to cooperate by failing
to perforrn an act which it has not undertaken to perform and is of no interest to
the other party, for example, a failure to accept a tender of performance by the
other party where that failure is of no consequence to it.47
In short, it is submitted that the better view is that in Mackay v Dick the
buyer was not bound to cooperate by allowing the testing of the machine to
occur. He had a choice either to cooperate or to suifer the consequences of his
lack of cooperation. Hence even though Lord Blackburn used the ianguage of
impiied terms strictiy speaking he need not have done it, for. characterising the
buyer’s conduct as wrongfui — as a breach of contract — adds nothing to the
soiution of this problem.
E. DISCHARGE THROUGH LACK OF COOPERATION
In many other cases there is equally no need to resort to the duty-based
approach to cooperation, for there is a simpier way of allocating the risks
involved. To take a particulariy illustrative set of circumstances, where in a
45 Mackay i’ Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251 (HL) 270-1 (Lord Watson).
46 Colley v Overseas Exporters {1921j 3 KB 302, 308.
47 O Lando and H Beale Principies ofEuropean ontract Law (Kluwer Law Inter-
national The Hague London Boston 2000) .120.
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building contract it is provided that the work shall be cornpleted by a certain
day and that liquidated damages shall be payable for any delay, the general rule
is that the building owner wil be unable to recover such damages jf he orders
extra work to be done which necessarily delays compIetion48Is this a breach
of contract, though?
According to Stoijar, there are two principies at work in this type of case:
the principie of prevention excusing the condition that rnakes payment
dependent upon compietion according to the term iii question; and the prin
ciple of cooperation which imposes an additionai duty upon the owner not to
make the builder’s performance more onerous — a breach of this duty creates
a further Iiability in damages over and above the contract price.49 But where
is the duty to cooperate in order to fadiitate performance of the bargain?
There is none.
A breach of contract is a breach of a duty arising under the contract, it is
‘committed when a party without Iawfui excuse fails or refuses to perforrn
what is due from him under the contract, performs defectively or incapaci
tates himself from performing.’5°So the question whether or not a parti-
cuiar contract has been broken depends primarily upon the precise cons
truction of its terms. Where there is no duty to be broken, there is no breach
of contract.
It is essential that one meticulously separates what is a breach from what is
not, for ‘[w]hen it comes to the law’s response to the facts, there is a crucial
difference between a wrong and a not-wrong. The label cwrong operates as a
licence to the iaw to mistreat the wrongdoer5’In order to decide whether
there has been a breach of contract, it is necessary to ask: first, what exactly the
parties have obliged themselves to do; and secondlly, whether there are any
good reasons for imposing an obligation on thern which they have not volun
tarily assumed.
48 See 1-lolme v Guppy (1838) 3 M&W 387; 150 ER 1 195; Macintosh v The Midland
Counties Rly (1845) 14 M&W 548; 153 ER 592; Russeli v Sá da Bandeira (1862) 13
CB(NS) 149; Westwood v Secretary ofState for India (1863) 7 LT 736; Roberts v Bury
Irnprovernents Comrnissioners (1870) LR 5 CP 310; Jones v St John’s Coilege, Oxford
(1870) LR 6 QB 115; Doddv Churton [1897] 1 QB 562 (CA); Troliope & Colis v North
West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board { 1973] 1 WLR 601; Astilieros Canarios SA
1’ Cape Hatteras Shipping Co [1982} 1 Lloyd’s Rep 518.
49 See SJ Stoijar ‘Prevention and co-operation in the iaw of contract’ (1953) 31
CanBarRev231, 238.
50 GH Treitel The Law .ofContract(lOth edn London Sweet & Maxwell 1999) 772.
51 J Birks ‘Rights, wrongs and remedies’ (2000) 20 OJLS 1, 33.
52 See 13 above.
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In my view a party’s failure to cooperate constitutes a breach of contract
only where the other party has legitimate expectations as to the purpose of
that specific act of cooperation. In the cinema ticket example52,for instance,
the theatre owner might well have been eager for that specific customer to
watch the fim. However, he had not bargained for the right to dernand that
the customer watch the fim, nor was there any reason why a court should
impose such an obligation on the customer, so the theatre owner’s expecta
tions are, in that respect, wholly irrelevant.
Let us examine for a moment the decision ofthe Court ofAppeal in Dodd
v Churton.53 This case is within the general rule by which, if the building
owner by ordering extras has prevented the performance of the work by the
specified date, he has deprived himself of the right to claim the penalties pro
vided for non-completion by that date. However, it is in this case particularly
obvious that this is so regardless of fault, regardless of whether one is in the
presence of a breach of contract. For in this case the building owner was
undoubtedly entitled to order those extras, inasmuch as he had the express
contractual right to do so. Even though he had not broken the contract, it was
clear that he had to bear the risk of delay himself. Consequently, by ordering
those extras he lost the right to claim liquidated damages for the untimely
completion of the work.
The sarne goes for any case in which the courts have decided that one ofthe
parties is discharged from a given duty because the other has actively or pas
sively prevented him from performing that duty — the concept of breach is
under those circurnstances entirely unnecessary.
F. THE CONCEPT OF A ‘BURDEN’
In the types of case previously discussed it is therefore inaccurate — and
even dangerously misleading — to describe cooperation as a contractual duty,
and it is quite surprising that such usage of the word ‘duty’ has so far survi
ved. Indeed, one cannot but frown at the manifest inconsistency ofthe courts’
behaviour when, on the one hand, they summarily reject a duty to act in good
faith on the ground that it would be inherently repugnant to the adversarial
ethic upon which English contract law is allegedly premised54,whilst on the
other hand imposing duties to cooperate in order to fadiitate the fulfilment
of ‘th bargain regardless of whose contractual expectations are at stake, as
53 [1897] 1QB562(CA).
54 See Lord Ackner’s speech in Walford v Miles {1992j 2 AC 128 (HL).
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though that adversarial ethic had suddenly vanished and the parties’ purposes
in contracting had become identical.
It seems that, whereas each contractual party has (arguably) the duty to
cooperate so as not to frustrate the other party’s 1egitmate expectations, when
it comes to his own legifimate expectations that party is merely faced with a
choice between two alternative courses of action, both ofwhich are lawful: he
may decide either to cooperate and fulfil his expectations or not to cooperate
and suifer the consequences of his own lack of cooperation. It is subrnitted
that, insofar as the latter type of expectation is concerned, the concept of a
burden’55 — rather than that of a duty — is much better suited to encapsulate
the true meaning of the requirernent of cooperation.
The concept of a burden might at first sight appear as somewhat unfamiiar
in the eyes of an English contract lawyer.56 However, if one takes a closer look
at the doctrine ofmitigation, one wffl soon come to the conclusion that the rea
lity behind that concept is in fact all too famiiar, even if not put in these terms.
Indeed) every English contract lawyer will readiy admit that the so-called ‘du
to mitigate’ is no real duty at all,57 in that a faiure to mitigate does not result
in the imposition of liabiity upon the innocent party. It rather operates pro
tanto as a conditional bar to the recovery of damages’58.In other words, the
innocent party is given the choice either to conduct himself according to the
canons of mitigation and subsequently recover his loss by way of an award of
damages, or alternatively to behave in whichever way he pleases and bear the
loss he may thus suifer himself. This is none other than a burden to mitigate.
To sum up, whenever a contracting party’s withdrawal of cooperation is of
no consequence to the other party, in that it is solely concerned with his own
55 See, as to the concept ofburden in German law, R Schmidt Die Obliegenheiten
(Versicherungswissenschaft Karlsruhe 1953) and K Larenz and M WoIf Aligemeiner
Teu des bürgerlichen Rechts (8th edn Munich 1997) 264.
56 At least insofar as substantive law is concerned. There is, of course, the long
-established concept of ‘burden of proof’ in procedural Iaw.
57 See GH Treitel The Law ofContract (lOth edn Sweet & Maxwell London 1999)
910 and Remediesfor Breach ofContract: a comparative account (repr pbk OUP Oxford
1991) 179; MG Bridge Mitigation of damages in contract and the meaning of avoi
dable loss’ (1989) 105 LQR 398, 399. See Koch Marine v D’Arnica Societá Di Naviga
zione ARL (The Elena D’Amico) [1980j 1 Lloyd’s Rep 75, 88; Sotiros Shipping mc and
Aeco Maritime SA v Sarneiet Solholt (The Solholt) [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 605 (CA) 608;
Empresa Cubana Importada de Alimentos “Alimport” v lasmos Shipping Co SA (The
Good Friend) [19841 2 Lloyd’s Rep 586, 597; Sealace Shipping Co v Oceanvoice (The
AlecosM) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 120 (CA) 124.
58 MG Bridge ‘Mitigation of damages in contract and the meaning of avoidable
loss’ (1989) 105 LQR 398, 399.
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legitimate contractual expectations, that party will not be in breach of a duty
to cooperate. He will have been subject to the burden of deciding whether to
cooperate and fulifi those expectations or not to cooperate and watch them
remam unfulfilled. That is, in a nutshell, the essence of a burden: the incentive
to act in a certain way by way of the attachment of a number of negative con
sequences to .every other possible course of action without at the sarne time
iabelling those alternative modes of conduct as civil wrongs — without charac
terising them as instances of unlawfui behaviour.
CHAPTER II
A CONDITIONAL APPROACH TO COOPERATION
A. CONTRACTUAL RISK-ALLOCATJON
It is cornrnonly thought by English contract iawyers that whenever an
event which was contractually expected to occur does not actually occur (or
vice-versa) the party who bears that risk is in breach of contract, and is the
refore liable for any loss which is caused by that non-occurrence. Taking the
risk of this non-occurrence is therefore generally considered to entail a pro
mise that it will occur. Where it is not possible to place the risk of the rele
vant non-occurrence on either party, it is widely understood that the con
tract is frustrated. However, there is a substantial difference between
contractual risk-allocation and the scope of contractual promises (the duties
involved).
As regards contractual risk-allocation, two significant trends can be per
ceived59:whereas what rnay be called ‘performance risks’ are usually allocated
to the promisor, the promisee normally takes what may be labelled ‘fruition
risks’. Indeed, as to the former, it can generally be said that a change of cir
cumstances that only upsets the way in which a promisor is to carry out his
promise is a risk taken by Mm alone. By and large, a person who undertakes
to do something takes the risk that performance ofhis undertaking rnay prove
more onerous than expected, ór even impossible (his efforts towards perfor
mance may then be lost). By way of iliustration, if 1 agree to drive someone to
59 See PS Atiyah .An Introduction to the Law of Contract (5th edn OUP Oxford
1995) 240-243. Compare JB Machado ‘Risco contratual e mora do credor’ (1985) 116
RJL 194 as to Portuguese law.
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the airport every Saturday rnorning of the year 2002 in exchange for a fixed
sum 1 take the risk of any sudden rise in the price of petrol.
Sirnilarly, as regards fruition risks, the promisee takes the risk of any
change of circumstances that disturbs his own individual purposes in con
tracting — he runs the risk that performance wili in the end not be suitable to
fuifli his needs, or that he will not be abie to benefit from it due to some fai
lure in his personal plan of action. Carrying on with the sarne example, my
passenger wiI bear the risk that his need to take weekiy flights wffl cease to
•exist, or that on any given occasion he might be unable to travei due to ilness.
The iatter type of risk is the one that this dissertation is mostly concerned
with. As far as R’s part in implernenting the contractual plan is concerned, we
are deaiing with a risk that is generally aliocated to R hirnself. Ordinariiy, the
refore, P should be abie to count on R’s cooperation, and should not be made
to suifer the consequences of a lack thereof, be it deliberate • or invoiuntary.
Nonetheiess, it does not inexorabiy foliow that prevention should always be
characterised as a breach of contract. It is possible for a contracting party to
agree to bear the risk of a given event not taking piace, without at the sarne
time promising that it wil (and vice-versa): that party rnereiy agrees to bear
the consequences of its non-occurrence; no breach, no wrongdoing.
Indeed, where one takes the risk that a certain event wiil take place, either
(a) the occurrence of that event is for the other party’s benefit, in which case
bearing the risk means promising that it wili happen — thus its non-occur
rence wii normally give rise to an award of darnages; or (b) it is not for the
other party’s benefit, in which case bearing the risk means suffering the con
sequences of its non-occurrence (generalIy speaking — but not necessarily —
the non-fuifiiment of one’s own contractual expectations) without being
excused from performing one’s own part ofthe contract.60This is typically the
case of insurance contracts: the insured takes the risk that the event insured
against may never occur, yet he never promises that it will — in fact he usually
prornises not to contribute in any way to the happening of the event insured
against — and in any case he is stiil liabie for his own part of the contract, that
is, payment of the agreed prernium.
To a certain extent, however, whether one can say that the taking place of
the event is for one or the other party’s benefit is highly dependent on whe
ther a promise was made in the first place, which means that for the rnost part
60 This is in no way connected to the civilian doctrine .ofthe fictional fuffilrnent of
a condition (see 35 below). The reason one is not excused from performing on&s own
part ofthe contract is that ones duty to perform is independent from the happening
•of the event, not that the event is deerned to have happened.
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this is solely a question of arriving at the proper construction of a contract.
But one thing is clear: the making of a contractual promise is not the only legal
means oftaking upon oneself a given contractual risk. There are other ways of
doing it, above aH that of resorting to the concept of condition instead.
B. INTRODUCING THE CONCEPT OF CONDITION
In certain types of contract, such as ali kinds of insurance (except life insu
rance) and some contracts of guarantee, the promisee only bargains for a con
ditional duty of performance in that he bears the risk of the other party’s per
formance never becoming due. How does he bear this risk? By stffl being liable
to perform his part of the contract.
Iri its proper sense the word ‘condition’ means some operative fact subsequent
to acceptance and prior to discharge, a fact upon which the rights and duties ofthe
parties depend. Such a fact may be an act of one of the two contracting parties, an
act of a third party or any other fact of our physical world. It may be a perfor
mance that has been promised or a fact as to which there is no promise’61
The former is usually called a promissory condition, the latter a contigent
condition. Hereafter 1 shall reserve the word ‘condition’ to mean contingent
conclition, unless otherwise stated.
The type of condition that 1 am mostly interested in is that which consists
of an act (or omission) of the promisee himself — in this case R — namely his
active or passive cooperation aimed at facilitating P’s performance. Such a
condition could theoreticaliy be characterised either as a condition precedent
or as a condition subsequent to P’s duty to supply his services to R. According
to the first approach ali that P would have promised would be to make his ser-
vices available to R and to execute whichever work R enabled him to do under
the circumstances. His duty to supply bis services to R would be merely con
ditional, in that only by cooperating could R turn it into an immediate duty
to effectively render his services.
However, jt is my intention to explore the possibility of characterising such
cooperation as a Cpotestative) condition subsequent to P’s duty to supply his
services to R,62 for it is my belief that in the typical case this characterisation
6.1 AL Corbin ‘Conditions in the law of contract’ (1919) 28 YaleLJ 739, 743. Italics
removed.
62 By ‘potestativ& condition 1 mean a condition whose fulfilment or non-fulfil
ment is primarily under the credito?s volitional control. See RJ Pothier Traité des
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is better suited to adequately transiate the true intention of the parties to a
contraCt, in that at the outset both parties regard themselves as being bound
to an immediate duty to conduct themselves in a certain way (that is, either to
supp1y the agreed services or to pay the agreed price), and it is only after R has
decided not to cooperate that they are in need ofa specific legal answer to their
problem.
1 shall hence be putting forward the view that R may have secured the dis
cretioflary power to release P from his duty to supply his services by refusing
to cooperate, and that P may have agreed to be under the correlative Iiability
to have R thus wipe out his duty at wil.63 This is, 1 may add, something enti
rely different from claiming that P has been released from the duty to perform
his promise. As Montrose has once stated,
[ijt is usual to say that the failure of the event upon which a prornise is condi
tional releases the prornisor from liability to perform the promise. This is only
true if promise is used as meaning the undertaking apart from the condition.
The true position is that by doing nothing the promisor does perform his pro
mise for he did not undertake to do anything in the event of a failure of the con
dition.64
Obligations 1 (nouvelie édn Thomine et Fortic Paris 1821) 170- 171. Pothier’s classifi
cation of conditions into potestative, casual and mixed conditions, although followed
in Scotland [see WM Gloag The Law of Contract: a Treatise on the Principies of Con
tractin theLaw ofScotland (2nd edn Caledonian Books Coilieston 1985) 276-281] and
the civil law systems [see R Zirnrnermann The Law ofObligations: Rornan Foundations
of the Civilian Tradition (OUP Oxford 1996) 722], is not yet widely recognised in
England. See, however, M Mark Chaimers’ Saie ofGoods (l8th edn Butterworths Lon
don 1981) 372-3, for the observation thatthe dassification of conditions in English
law is imperfect and unsatisfactory, and that for accuracy some such subdivision is
required.
63 Corbin ‘Conditions in thelaw ofcontract’ (1919) 28 YaleLJ 739, 742. For the
distinction between the right 1 duty relation and the power 1 liabiity relation see WN
Flohfeld ‘Some fundamentailegal conceptions as applied injudicial reasoning’ (1913)
23 YaIeLJ 16, 28-32 and 44-54.
64 JL Montrose ‘Conditions, warranties, and other contractual terms’ (1937) 15
CauBarRev 309, 3 16. See also 0W Ho]mes The Cornmon Law (Dover Publications
New York 1991) 3 18, where the author uses words to the effect that the promisee’s part
of the contract is as truly kept and performed by doing nothing where the condition




c. A DISCRET1ONARY POWER TO COOPERATE?
Ordinarily, upon entering a contract each contracting party wiil have a
certain amount of interest in what the other party is offering, and must the
refore be willing to cooperate in order to fulifi the bargain. As a result, the
precise characterisation of the requirement of cooperation rnay not be very
cleariy stated. But lii fact, had there been an officious bystander asking R
whether he was truly committing himseif to cooperate, perhaps he would say
he was not. For, as previously remarked, there are other ways — over and
above the making of a prornise — of bringing about a certain desired action
by another person.
It seems perfectly plausible that sorneone would wish to secure a contrac
tual right to a given service without at the sarne time prornising that he will
accept it when the time comes, or that he will cooperate in order to enable
the other party to supply it. To take a typical case, P and R enter a contract for
the painting of a portrait. P’s undertaking obviously depends upon R’s coope
ration. However, R does not necessarily wish to bind himself to cooperate.
He rnay bargain for the right — not the obligation — to have his portr.ait pain
ted. In other words, he may purchase P’s time and skifls — his availahiity —
without at the sarne time committing himself actually to benefit from them.
Surely R must be required not to make P’s performance any more onerous
than P should reasonably expect it to be at the time of contracting. Nonethe
less, shouid R decide not to cooperate at ali, what happens is that P’s duty
effëctively to paint the portrait never becomes due, inasmuch as he has been
released before it ever did. It is as simple as that. Of course, P must under no
circumstances be injured by this situation. Where he has bargained for the fuli
contract price, his expectation to receive it should somehow be protected. The
difficulty with the present submission is that, as the law currently stands, the
protection of P’s expectation to the fuli contract price appears to be utterly
irrecondilable with the recognition of R’s choice not to cooperate.
D. THE OBSTACLE: A RIGHT TO PERFORM
The main obstacle to the submission that R might under some circums
tances have bargained for a discretionary power to cooperate — rather than
having promised to do so — seems to be the widely accepted requirement that
P must earn his right to the fuil contract price by actually supplying his ser-
vices to R. This requirernent effectiveiy calls for the recognition of P’s right
to earn the fuil contract price, that is, a right to supply bis services to R — in
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essence, a right to perform his part of the contract.65 As long as one sustains
the view that by preventing P from supplying his services R wffl also be pre
venting him from earning his right to the fuil contract price, there is no way
of contending that R should be recognised such a discretionary power, for its
exercise would autornatically injure P’s legitimate contractual expectations.66
At first sight the so-called doctrine of the fictional fulfflment of conditions
appears to offer a way out. As Lord Watson observed in Mackay v Dick:
The respondents were only entitled to receive payment of the price of the
machine on the condition that it should be tried at a proper working face provi-
ded by the appellant, and that on trial it should excavate a certain amount of clay
or other soft substance within a given time. They have been thwarted in the
atternpt to fulifi that condition by the neglect or refusal ofthe appellant to furnish
the means of applying the stipulated test; and their failure being due to his fault,
1 am of opinion that, as in a question with hjm, they must be taken to have fui-
fflled the condition.67
In the situation under analysis, an application of the doctrine ofthe fictio
nal fulfflment of conditions would entail that, whenever R ‘culpably’ preven
ted P from actualiy supplying his services by withdrawing his cooperation,
P’s performance must be deemed to have been completed, and his right to the
fuli contract price thereby taken to have been duly earned. However, it has
been repeatedly stated by both judges and academics that this doctrine
— which derives from a principie of civil law that was later imported frito Scot
tish law — is definiteiy not part of English law.68 Indeed, English Iaw typically
65 While the idea of a ‘right to perform’ is not habitual in Engiish discussions,
see S Whittaker ‘Performance of another’s obligation: French and English iaw con
trasted’ (2000) OUCLF 7 at ouclf.iuscomp.org. For a discussion ofthis subject in Por-
tuguese law see JC Silva Cumprimento e Sanção Pecirniária Compulsória (reprint 2th
edn SBFDUC Coimbra 1997) 1 16 and FAC Sá Direito ao Cumprimento e Direito a
Cumprir (Almedina Coimbra 1997).
66 See PM Nienaber ‘The effect of anticipatory repudiation: principie and policy’
[19621 CLJ 213, 224; F Dawson ‘Metaphors and anticipatory breach of contract’
[1981] CLJ 83, 96. See, however, Anon Anticipatory breach: right ofplaintiff to per
form’ (1963-66) 2 AdelLRev 103, 112 for the suggestion that the.nature of a contract
and the circumstances of its inception ‘be scrutinised in order that the court may
determine whether it was witbin the intention of the parties that if one party repu
diates, the other should have a .right to perform in addition to his remedy in damages’.
67 Mackay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251 (HL) 270. See also Scott J’s analysis ofthis
case in Thompson vAsda-MFI Group plc [1988] Ch 241, 252-253..
68 That this is so is not disputed, at least not since the decision in Laird v Pim
(1841) 7 M&W 474; 151 ER 852. See also Thornpson vAsda-MFlGroupplc [1988j Ch
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deals with this particular problem through the remedy of an award of dama-
ges for breach of contract69
Moreovei this doctrine contains an unattractive element of punishrnent,
inasmuch as it constitutes the law’s response to what is essentially characte
rised as a breach of contract — its operation is always triggered by what is con
sidered to be an unlawful conduct. So for the purposes of this dissertation it
is entirely unhelpful. Hence in order to sustain the view that R should lawfully
be able to prevent P from supplying his services by choosing to withdraw his
cooperation, one must first do away with the thought that contractual parties
must have the right to perfbrrn their own part of the contract so as to be in a
position to claim their right to the counter-performance.
E. THE HJDDEN ASSUMPTION STRIKES AGAIN
The requirement that P must earn his right to the fuil contract price by
duly supplying his services is far from universal. In fact, in cases such as that
of the cinema ticket, everyone will readily admit that R is free to decide whe
ther to turn up and watch the fim or do something else instead. The reason
why such a requirement has never been considered in this type of case seems
to be that under those circumstances there is no room for the question whe
ther P must earn his right to the fuil contract price, inasmuch as that price is
payable in advance at the box office — a right cannot be conditional where it
is already due. But why do courts impose this requirement in every other case?
The truth is, when coming across a contract for the supply of services, the
courts have consistently been taking for granted that P must without ques
tion earn his right to the fuil contract price by duly supplying .his services
to R before he becomes entitled to claim it. Indeed, they start off by embra
cing the dogma that P’s right to the fuil contract price is conditional upon the
actual supply of services only to arrive at its logical consequence: whenever
R’s cooperation is necessary to facilitate that supply of services, it cannot pos-
sibly be discretionary, since the recognition of any discretion mi the part of R
would inexorably injure P’s legitimate contractual expectations. At this stage
241, 266; Little v Courage Ltd (1995) 70 P&CR 469, 474. See also GH Treitel ‘Fault in
the common law of contract’ in B Maarten and 1 Brownlie (edd) Liber Amicorum for
the Rt Hon Lord Wilberforce (OUP Oxford 1987) 185.
69 See Inchbald v Western Neilgherry Coffee, etc, Co (1864) 17 CB (NS) 733; Colley
1) Overseas Exporters [1921] 3 KB 302, 309; Bournemouth & Boscombe Athletic FC
v Manchester United FC The Times May 22 1980 (CA); Alpha Trading v Dunnshaw
-Patten [1981] QB 290 (CA).
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it is apparent that one has come across another one of the courts’ hidden
assumptions.
As has been previously stated, the so-called duty to cooperate is allegedly
imposed solely for the purpose of giving fuil effect to the contract. Accor
dingly a party does not infringe it simply by failing to perform an act that is
of no consequence to the other party.7°However, in order to determine whe
ther or not such an act is of consequence to the other party one needs to find
out whether, upon a proper construction of the contract, P’s right to the frui
contract price in any way depends on R’s cooperation in frue first place. What
is the point of stating that the duty to cooperate will only be infringed where
the withdrawai of cooperation is of consequence to the other party, if one
is going to start off by assuming that it always will be? It is submitted that,
at least in some cases, R does no harm by refusing to cooperate — the law does,
by taking for granted that P’s right to the contract price is always conditional
upon his actual supply of services.
F. P’s EXPECTATION TO THE FULL CONTRACT PRICE
In order to reach a reasonabie solution to this problem it is therefore essen
tial that one takes a dose look at the contract under anaiysis and at its sur
rounding circumstances and then attempts to determine what exactly each
party has bargained for and the exact scope oftheir rights and duties.7’In this
respect, one must just ask: did P in this particular factual situation take the
risk that R might be unwihing to cooperate?
In some cases — for instance those of the estate agent’s cornmission72— one
will most probably reach the conciusion that he did, for it is now beyond dis
pute that, unless otherwise stated, shouid R decide not to go through with the
saie P is left with nothing. In this situation, the recognition ofR’s discretionary
70 See O Lando and H Beale Principies of European Contract Law (Kluwer Law
International The Hague London Boston 2000) 120, quoted 26 above.
71 See Prenn v Sirnrnonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 (HL) 1385 (Lord Wilberforce); Rear
don Smith Line Ltd v YngvarHansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 (HL) 995-6 (Lord Wil
berforce); Chatenay v Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co [1891) 1 QB 79 (CA) 85.
72 See Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v ooper [1941j AC 108 (HL) — see 24 above. See
also Rhodes v Forwood (1876) 1 App Cas 256, 272, 274; Hamlyn & Co v Wood & Co
[1891] 2 QB 488 (CA) 493 and Lazarus v Cairn Line ofSteamships (1912) 17 Com Cas
107, 114 where the courts refused to imply a terrn that the principal in an agency




power to decide whether to cooperate or not to cooperate is uncontroversial:
P’s right to his commission is subject to a potestative condition73,and it is
totally up to R either to fulifi it or not.
In other cases, reaching a definitive conclusion on this matter will not be
as straightforward. In Bournemouth eb Boscombe Athletic FC v Manchester
United FC74, a professional footballer was transferred for a fee, a small part of
which was to be paid oniy after he had scored twenty goals for the new ciub.
Before he had done so, the club hired a new manager, who in turn decided to
drop him from the first team. The Court of Appeal held that the defendants
were in breach as they failed to give the player a reasonable opportunity to
score the twenty goals. In short, they regarded this situation as one of defer
red rernuneration. However, there is certainly room for the view that, on a
proper construction of this contract, the risk that the piayer might never be
able to fulifi the condition should have been borne by the claimants. Indeed,
it is extremely difficult to imagine that a football club of the defendants’ stan
ding would, when cyjjg) a virtually unknown piayer offa modest third divi
sion club, commit itself to such an unusual temi — a term which meant that
they were effectively bound to keep him in the flrst team for a reasonable
period of time, in order to give him Ca fair chance’ of scoring those twenty
goals. Hence, not only was the implication of this term wholly unnecessary,
it was also fairly unreasonable, according to the most elementary .commercial
criteria.
In the vast majority of cases, however, one wilI promptly come to the con
clusion that P did not take the risk that R might be unwilling to cooperate, in
that he has bargained for the right to the fuil contract price. Where that is the
case, his expectation to be paid the fuil contract price is wholly legitimate and
must therefore be adequately protected. Sure enough this right is usually con
ditional upon his duly performing his part of the contract (condition is being
used here in its promissory sense). But what exactly does his part of the con
tract consist of? That is the next question in need of a clear answer.
By and large, two different techniques may be employed in order to pro
tect P’s expectation to the fuil contract price, each of them operated by one
of two possible and fairly diverse approaches to cooperation: (a) the promis
sory approach to cooperation; and (b) the conditional approach to coopera-
tion. For, as Corbin once stated, Cboth a promise and a condition are means
that are used to bring about a certain desired action by another person.’75The
73 See n 62 above.
74 The Times May 22 1980 (CA).
75 AL Corbin CConditions in the Iaw of contract’ (19.19) 28 YaJeLJ 739, 746.
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former is the one taken up by the courts when implying their duties of coo-
peration. lts rationale and modus operandi have been sufficiently outlined in
Chapter One.
The promissory approach to cooperation can be quite useful in circums
tances such as those in Fechter v Montgomery76,a case where the manager of
a London theatre engaged a theatre performer at a salary for two years and
it was held that the manager was under an irnplied duty to give the actor a
reasonable opportunity to appear on stage. Indeed, in this type of case both
parties have an obvious contractual interest in securing such an appearance.
One might say that here the consideration is not just the money — it is the
money plus the opportunity to enhance P’s professional reputation.77The
sarne could be said of a case such as Planché v Calburn78,where P agreed to
write a book on costume and ancient armour that was to be published in
serial form in R’s periodical. Similarly, taking up once again the example of
the artist who is engaged to paint someone’s portrait, where that someone
happens to be a celebrity one could easily imagine that both parties will have
entered the contract with a view to securing the actual completion of the
portrait itseif.
Nonetheless, in most other cases P will have no direct interest in perfor
rning his part of the contract. His interest in his own performance wil lie
solely in its being the only means of securing his right to the counter-perfor
mance — the payment ofthe fuil contract price. Whenever that is the case, one
can equally adopt a conditional approach to cooperation and resort to the
second technical device designed to protect P’s expectation to the fuli contract
price, namely that of characterising the requirement of cooperation as a con
tingent condition (subsequent) to P’s duty to supply his services to R.
According to this approach, R has the power — not the duty — to cooperate
with P and thereby tie him to his duty to effectively render his services. The
exercise of this power is discretionary: he has a choice either to cooperate and
fulfil bis own contractual expectations or not to cooperate and fail to earn his
right to the services he bargained for, whilst still being bound to perform his
own part of the contract — the payment of the fuil contractual price.
76 ( 1863) 33 Beav 22. See also Marbé v George Edwardes (Daly’s Theatre) Ltd
[1928] 1 KB 269; Herbert Clayton &Jack Waller v Oliver [1930] AC 209 (HL).
77 ‘The consideration which was promised to Mr Montgomery. . . is twofold, he
was to receive seven guineas a week, and was to have an opportunity of shewing what
his abilities were before a London audienc& Sarne case 29. In this case the contract
was au empioyrnent contract, but it is submitted that the sarne rationale applies,
mutatis mutandis, to the case of a contract for the supply of theatrical services.
78 (1831) 8 Bing 14; 131 ER 305.
39
MARGARIDA LIMA REGO
In short, rather than imposing duties of cooperation, this approach works
by imposing what has previously been described as a burcIen’79:R is absolu
tely free to choose whether or not to cooperate. Either way bis conduct wffl be
perfectly lawful. Howevei he must bear the consequences ofwhichever course
of action he ends up taking. To put it another way, he is free to renounce the
benefit of the contract, but he must cooperate if he wishes to have it.
G. WaAT EXACTLY IS AT STAKE HERE?
In the latter group of cases one starts off with the need to choose between
these two very different approaches to cooperation. This choice should not be
made in the abstract, for its outcome should ultimately depend on the proper
construction of the contract under analysis. However, so far the courts have
been following the promissory path without even realising that there is a
choice to be made. In my view this state of affairs is not wholly satisfactory.
1 shall proceed my lime of reasoning by taking a closer look at the alternative
approaches from each contracting party’s own stanclpoint.
Let us take P’s side to begin with. If one follows the promissory approach
such as it has been adopted by the courts80 and decides that R is under a duty
to cooperate in order to facilitate P’s supply of services and that P will only be
able to claim the fuil contract price if he does supply his services, fmancially
speaking his only remedy in the event of non-performance due to R’s lack of
cooperation wffl be an award of damages. Alternatively, ifone foflows the con
ditional approach to cooperation, whilst R will be under no duty to cooperate,
P’s right to the fuil contract price wffl in no way depend on the materialisation
of such cooperation. If it does not materialise P wil still be entitled to claim
the fuil contract price.81
From P’s standpoint, the latter is a much more advantageous cause of
action than the former. Moreover, it makes his position much clearer, in that
the issue of the standard of R’s duty to cooperate does not even occur. Should
79 See 28-30 above.
80 Theoretically, one could also follow the promissory approach to cooperation
and simultaneously argue that P’s right to the fuil contract price does not depend on
the actual supply of services, given that these views are not mutually exclusive. 1 shall
not, however, dweil o.n such an unlikeiy hypothesis, for it shares ali of the conditional
approach to cooperation’s disadvantages without at the sarne time partaking of the
bulk of its advantages.
ai Even though, at the end of the day, the amount he ends up receiving might be
inferior to the fuli contract price. See 59-61 below.
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one follow the duty-based approach to cooperation, one might be lured into
believing in the sort of reasoning which contends that ali R is required to do
is exercise his duty to cooperate with due dlligence)82 whereas the burden
-based approach to cooperation makes it crystal clear that this is purely a
matter of risk-allocation, where fault is irrelevant, and that consequently,
should there be any problem whatsoever regarding R’s cooperation, he wil be
the one to suifer its negative effects — not P.83 Therefore it would appear that,
if given a choice, P would gladlly opt for the conditional approach to coope
ration.
As for R, at this stage it is already fairly conspicuous that it would be in his
best interest to follow the conditional approach to cooperation, for he would
in fact be choosing between binding himself to a duty on the one hand and
obtaining a discretionary power on the other hand. Securing his right to P’s
services without at the sarne time binding hirnself to cooperate in order to
fadiitate P’s performance would undoubtedly be the better deal. Nonetheless,
as far as R’s position is concerned, the fuil extent ofthis approach’s superiority
will not be fully apparent until later on in rny argument.84
H. WHAT THE PARTJESHAVE TRULY PROMISED TO DO
Hence, at least in theory, in a fair number of cases it wil be in both parties’
best interest to stick to a conditional approach to cooperation. Ultimately,
however, this rnatter wil turn on the proper construction of each individual
contract. What rnust in every particular case be deterrnined is whether, all
thin.gs considered, one should reach the conclusion that P has a genuine right
to perform the services he has contracted to supply, and conversely whether
R’s commitrnent extends to an obligation to allow and even facilitate P’s
supply of services, or whether it is confined to the obligation to pay him the
agreed remuneration.
Generally speaking, would it rnake sense for P to bargain for a right to per
forrn such services — bearing in mmd the extra transaction costs that this
would entail — where in most cases he has no interest in actually performing
his part of the contract, given that his only interest in perforrning lies in se-
curing his right to the counter-performance — the payrnent ofthe fuli contract
82 See Anon ‘Unilateral contract law — an analysis in terms of conditions’ (1933)
33 ColLRev 463, 473-5 and cases cited therein.
83 Byway of•fflustration, see Dodd v Churton [1897] 1 QB 562 (CA). See 28 above.
84 See 59-69 below.
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price? As has already been demonstrated, only in the leading actor type of case
— where actual performance is part ofthe bargain, together with the price — is
the adoption of the promissory approach prima facie more appropriate than
the conditional one. Why bargain for the right to perform uniess one cannot
wholly fulfil one’s contractual expectations without it? 1 believe that quite
often such a right has in fact not been (expressiy or implicitly) bargained fot
In my view, if one takes a fresh and open-minded look at each particular
factual situation, one undoubtedly finds that, in some (if not ali) of those
cases, R will not have committed himself to cooperate. At the very least, one
will surely not come across anything that decisiveiy points towards the con
clusion that he did. Whenever this is the case, if one also concludes that P did
not take the risk that R’s cooperation would not materialise, what must logi
cally follow is that whenever R chooses not to cooperate P must be released
from his duty to render his services to him whilst retaining his right to the fuil
contract price. Returning to one of our previously mentioned examples, it is
subrnitted that in some (ifnot ali) cases one wili find that P will not have pro
rnised to paint the portrait; he wifl have promised to paint the portrait pro
vided he can count on R’s cooperation.
To sum up, if P’s performance is conditional upon something that is at R’s
discretion — R’s cooperation — and P’s right to earn the contract price is not
regarded as being conditional upon that sarne thing (the fact that he is cur
rently recognised the right to an award of damages proves that it is not), the
only possible result of the adding up ofboth of these premises is that P’s right
to the fuil contract price rnust not be made dependent upon the actual supply
of his services to R. Thus the way may be cleared for an unprejudiced cons
truction of each individual contract for the supply of services in the manner
that best serves the parties’ legitirnate contractual expectations.
CHAPTER III
THE RTGHT TO REJECT THE BENEFIT OF THE CONTRACT
A. WiT IF NO COOPERATION IS NEEDED?
In the previous chapter, 1 have argued that the parties must at the very least
be recognised the freedom to decide whether or not they wish to cornmit
thernselves to cooperating with one another in the completion ofthe contract.
Indeed, in accordance with what has been so far contended, the choice between
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either the promissory or the conditional approaches to cooperation is ulti
mately a rnatter for the proper construction of the individual contract, and it
is therefore pretty much left to the parties themselves to decide how best to
protect their own interests in each transaction.
Nonetheless, the recognition of a power to prevent another’s contractual
performance through the withdrawal of one’s cooperation cannot provide R
with an answer to his problem in ali those cases where P happens to be abie to
complete his part ofthe contract without R’s cooperation and even against his
will. lt is in this context that the controversial decision of the House of Lords
in White & Carter (Councils) v McGregor5comes into piay.
: jfl this case a majority of the House of Lords reached the seemingiy logicai
and yet somewhat grotesque conclusion that whenever P can perform his part
of the contract without R’s cooperation he has an unfettered right to do so in
order to recover the fuil contract price as it becomes due.86 In doing so he may
wholly disregard the fact that R is no longer interested in his performance,
even where — subject to one important qualification87 — the services he is
about to provide have turned out to be something entirely futile and of no
value to anybody. Hence, as the law currently stands, in these circumstances
R’s hands are tied: whether he wants it or not, he has no choice but to endure
P’s services, should he choose to suppiy them. He has contracted for another
to make his bed, n.ow he rnust lie on it.
Thus
[ijf a customer deposits his clothes to be cleaned, and then canceis the order before
the work has been carried out, the cleaner may nevertheless clean the clothes and
demand the fuil contract price. . . . The giri whose fiancé declares that he wffl not
be present on the agreed wedding day rn.ay nevertheiess proceed to ff11 her bottom
drawer in the hope that he will change his mmd and in the knowledge that, if he
does not, damages for breach of promise must take into account the expendture
incurred up to the agreed wedding date and not only up to the date of the repu
diation ofthe engagement.88
85 [1962] AC413.
86 fl- Hounslow London BC v Twickenham Gardens Developments [1971] Ch 233, 253
it was further clarified that such constraint would only apply to cases where no coopera-
tion — either active or passive — was required in order for P to be capabie ofperforming.
87 That is, unless it can be shown that he has ‘no legitimate interest, financial or
otherwise, in performing the contract rather than claiming damages’. White & Carter
(Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] AC 413 (HL) 431 (Lord Reid). For a carefui analy
sis of this qualification see 54-59 below.
88 Anon ‘Contract: anticipatory breach and mitigation of damages’ (1962) 233
Law Times 381. See Clark v Marsiglia (1845) 1 Denio 317 and Frost v Knight (1872)
LR 7 Ex 1 1 1 for real-life exampies of similar factual situations.
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As previously stated, the focal point ofmy dissatisfaction with the White d
Carter case was R’s utter powerlessness to prevent P from supplying his servi-
ces to him. III that sort offactual situation something which had typically been
secured for R’s sole benefit — his right to demand P’s performance — rnay later
turn out to have become entirely worthless or even potentially damaging to
him and yet, according to the aforementioned decision, there is absolutely
nothing he can do to prevent such performance from taking place. He lacks
any control whatsoever over an act or omission whose sole purpose should
have been to benefit Mm and him alone. Why should it be so?
B. THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT
After a contract has been entered into but before the time fixed for perfor
mance has come one contracting party may repudiate it by letting the other
party know that he does not intend to perform his part of the contract when
it becomes due. This is called an anticip.atoiy breach of contract.89 The cur
rent legal response to such sort of behaviour was first devised in 1853 in the
case of Hochster v De La Tour.90 Given that neither party has a right unilate
rally to rescind a contract, the repudiation appears to be fictionally regarded
as an invitation to rescind which the innocent party may choose to accept and
immediately sue for damages if he sees fit; alternatively he may choose to
wholly disregard it, in which case the contract remains in fuil effect, which
accounts for Asquith LJ’s famous aphorism, paraphrasing Keats, that ‘[a]n
unaccepted repudiation is a thing writ in water and ofno value to anybody9’
The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract was initially thought out to
provide a party who had been told he would not get the benefit ofthe contract
with an immediate remedy. This remedy, however, consisted in an option —
the injured party was obviously not under an obligation to terminate the con
tract, for that would amount to an acknowledgment that the . repudiating
89 For a thorough account of the advent and development of this doctrine in
English law see M Mustii ‘Anticipatory breach of contract: the common law at work’
in Butterworth Lectures 1989-90 (Butterworths London 1990) 1 . For a comparative
study ofthe sarne subject see S Whittaker How does french law deal with anticipatory
breach of contract?’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 662 and CF Almeida ‘Recusa de cumprimento
declarada antes do vencimento’ in Estudos em Memória do Professor Doutor João de
Castro Mendes (Lex Lisbon 1995) 289-317. Note that not every anticipatory breach of
contract arnounts to a repudiation of the contract.
90 (1853) 2 E&B 678; 1 18 ER 922.
91 Howard v Pickford Tool Co [ 1951] KB 417 (CA) 421 (Asquith LJ).
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party had the power to bring the contract to an end at wffl — something which
might dangerously undermine the entire institution of contract as we know it.
This is essentialiy why it must be Ieft to the innocent party to decide whether
to accept or to reject the repudiation.
In its inception, therefore, this doctrine was never intentionally aimed at
allowing one party to wholly disregard the other party’s position and to per
form his part of the contract knowing only too well his performance to be fully
unwanted and perhaps even potentially damaging to the latter. And yet this is
what happens if one chooses to apply it to those cases where (1) the injured
party’s performance is supposed to precede that of the repudiating party and
(2) the latter cannot prevent such performance by refusing to cooperate. Whe
never this is the case an indiscrjminate application of the doctrine of anticipa
tory breach of contract wffl have the effect of allowing P to render his services
in the face of R’s averred loss of interest: unable to prevent such performance
from taking place, as the law currently stands R has no choice but to endure it.
In the White & Carter case the respondents agreed to pay the appellants
a flxed sum to have their garage business advertised for three years on plates
attached to litter bins. Later the sarne day the garage owners repudiated the
contract but the advertising contractors nevertheless displayed the plates and
subsequently clairned the ftill contract price. A rnajority ofthe House ofLords
upheld the claim.92 The main reason given was that according to Hochster
v De La Tour repudiation did not of itself bring a contract to an end, but
merely gave the injured party an option to terrninate the contract. Since the
advertising contractors chose instead to affirrn it, the contract remained in fuil
effect. The minority, on the other hand, essentially contended that a contrac
ting party had no right to ignore another party’s repudiation where speciflc
performance was unavailable, and that the mitigation rules were applicable
from the time of repudiation.
c. MISSING THE POINT
The House of Lords’ decision in the White ó Carter case has been widely
criticised by cornrnentators from all quarters ofthe comrnon law worid.93 It is
92 Lords Reid, Tucker and Hodson (Lords Morton and Keith dissenting). The
Scottish case ofLangford & Co v Dutch 1952 SC 15, indistinguishable on the facts, was
overruled.
93 See PM Nienaber ‘The effect of anticipatory repudiation: principie and policy’
[1962] CLJ 213; AL Goodhart ‘Measure of damages when a contract is repudiated’
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said to encourage wasteful performance Ieading to inefficient results, to be
inconsistent with the principie of mitigation, to allow what amounts to an
indirect specific performance of contracts that are not specifically enforceable,
and more generally to reward what adds up, in essence, to unconscionable
behaviour. It has not been followed iii a number of other common law juris
dictions.94Nonetheless, when browsing through the numerous comrnentaries
that this decision has inspired, one often comes across remarks to the effect
that in that decision ‘ [tjhere is an obvious tension between the impeccable
Iogic of the rnajority and the intuitive sense ofjustice of the minority95
Indeed, as regards the thoroughly scrutinised and somewhat worn out
contention that the solution to this problem must lie in the principie of miti
gation and its underlying policy — the desirabiity of avoiding waste — it is not
uncommon even for its fiercest supporters to own up to some of its technical
weaknesses. Above ali they admit to the fact that, at any rate as conventionally
applied, this principie is directed at the mitigation of ioss arising from a
breach of contract in view of the subsequent calculation of the measure of
damages to be awarded so as to compensate the injured party for his unfui
fihled contractual expectations. It should follow that the principie cannot be
used to support the view that that party ought to relinquish his right to the
[1962] 78 LQR 263; MP Furmston The case of the insistent performer’ (1962) 25
MLR 364; K Scott ‘Contract — Repudiation — Performance by innocent party’ [1962j
CLJ 12; RG McKerron ‘Effect of election not to accept antcipatory repudiation of
contract: White & Carter v McGregor’ (1962) 79 SALJ 309; Anon Anticipatory
breach: right ofpiaintiffto perform’ (1963-66) 2 AdelLRev 103; SJ Stoljar Sorne pro
blems ofanticipatorybreach’ (1974) 9 Me1ULRev 355, 368; LJ Priestley ‘Conduct after
breach: the position ofthe party not in breach’ (1990-91) 3 JCL 218; A Burrows Reme-
dies for Torts and Breach of Contract (2nd edn Butterworths London 1994) 321-322;
MP Furmston Cheshire, Fifoot ó Furmston’s Law ofContract (l3th edn Butterworths
London 1996) 631.633; JW Carter, A Phang and SY Phang ‘Performance following
repudiation: legal and economic interests’ (1999) 15 JCL 97. See, howevei WED
Davies Anticipatorybreach and mitigation ofdamages’ (1960-62) 5 UWAusLRev 576,
588-590; E Tabachnik Anticipatory breach of contract’ [1972] 25 CLP 149, 164-172;
F Dawson ‘Metaphors and anticipatory breach of contract’ [1981] CLJ 83, 106-107.
94 See Clark v Marsiglia (1845) 1 Denio 317 and Rockíngham County v Luten
Bridge (1929) 35 F 2d 301 (USA); Fineili v Dee (1968) 67 DLR (2d) 393 (obiter) and
Asamera Ou Corp v Sea Ou Corp (1979) 89 DLR (3d) 1 (Canada). See, however, The
rale in White & Carter (Coundils) Ltd v McGregor’ — a report by the Contracts and
Commerciai Law Reforrn Committee, presented to the New Zealander Minister of
Justice on 5 May 1983 (New Zealand Law Society), for a somewhat ambiguous posi
tion as to the correctness of the White & Carter case.
95 Jw Carter, A Phang and SY Phang Cf following repudiation: legal
and economic interests’ (1999) 15 JCL 97, 102.
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promised counter-performance and sue for damages for breach of contract
instead, in order to reduce the amount of rnoney that the breaching party
would have to partake with if forced to perforrn his part of the contract96
The argument here appears to be premised on the need to look to the subs
tance rather than the form: while there is a logical distinction between an action
for a debt and an action for breach (and hence between recovery of a debt and
recovery of damages), the injustice that the doctrine of mitigation was intended to
prevent is nevertheless the sarne (in substance) on facts such as the present where
the action is in debt97
But to what extent are form and substance truly irreconcilable in the situa-
tion under analysis? Is it absolutely necessary for such basic conceptual dis
tinctions as that of an action in debt and one for breach of contract to be mer
cilessly trampled over in order for the courts to achieve practicaijustice? Gjven
the startling nature of such an assertion, one has no choice but to wonder: is
the logic of the majority in the White á Carter case so ‘impeccable’?
One could aiways argue that P’s conduct in ignoring R’s best interests
whilst supplying his services usually goes against the principie that contracting
parties must cornply with the requirement of good faith when performing and
enforcing their contracts. Indeed, this une of argument has occasionally been
foiowed in the US.98 However, one would .rnost probably be faced with the
contention that in English law there is no such thing as a general duty to
comply with good faith. Not so long ago, Lord Ackner utterly rejected its exis
tence (albeit in the context of pre-contractual negotiations), saying that the
concept was both unworkable in practice and inherently repugnant to the
adversarial ethic upon which English contract iaw is premised99 Hence in
96 See Tredegar Iron & Coal Co v Hawthorn Bros á Co (1902) 18 TLR 716 (CA)
716; Shindler v Northern Raincoat Co [1960] 1 WLR 1038, 1048. See WED Davies
‘Anticipatory breach and rnitigation of darnages’ (1960-62) 5 UWAusLRev 576.
97 Jw Carter, A Phang and SY Phang ‘Performance following repudiation: legal
and economic interests’ (1999) 15 JCL 97, 102.
98 See Ciark v Marsiglia (1845) 1 Denio 317, where it was first estabiished that for
P ‘to persist in accumulating a larger dernand is not consistent with good faith’. See
D Friedrnann ‘Good faith and remedies for breach of contract’ in J Beatson and
D Friedrnann (edd) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (OUP Oxford 1997) 399,
421-425.
99 Walford i’ Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL) 138. On good faith in English law more
generally, see J Steyn ‘The role of good faith and fair dealing in contract Iaw: a hair
shirt phiosophy’ [1991] Denning LJ 131; JF O’Connor Good Faith in English Law
(Darthmouth Publishing Co Aldershot 1991); R Goode ‘The concept of “good faith”
in English law’ (Centro di Studi e Richerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero, Saggi,
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English case law one wffl often find statements to the effect that ‘[a] person
who has a right under a contract or other instrument is entided to exercise it
and can effectively exercise it for a good reason or a bad reason or no reason
at ali.’100 Oi, in Lord Reid’s own words in the White & Carter case, ‘[ijt might
be, but it never has been, the law that a person is only entitled to enforce his
contractual rights in a reasonable way, and that a court will not support an
attempt to enforce them in an unreasonable way’°’
It is beyond the purpose of this dissertation to chailenge such widely dis
seminated views, however tempting that may be. Moreover, it is my beljefthat
in the White Carter case Lord Reid has totally missed the point. And so have
those who trust the answer to this problem to lie in the principie ofgood faith.
Indeed, the good faith une of reasoning has essentialiy been used to counter
the statement that a party can exercise his contractual rights for any reason or
no reason at ali. However, in order to discuss how one should and should not
exercise one’s contractual rights, it is necessary to establish which contractual
rights one does have in the first place. In the situation under analysis, the
Conferenze e Seminari 2, Rome 1992); the several papers arising from the Fourth
Annual Conference of the JCL on ‘Good faith and fairness in commercial contract
law’ published in (1994) 7 JCL and (1995) 8 JCL; JN Adams and R Brownsword Key
Issues in Contract (Butterworths London 1995) Ch 7; R Brownsword ‘ “Good faith in
contracts” revisited’ (1996) 49 CLP 1 1 1; J Beatson and D Friedmann (edd) Good Faith
and Fault iii ContractLaw (OUP Oxford 1997); R Harrison Good Faith in Saies (Sweet
and Maxwell London 1997); G Teubner ‘Legal irritants: good faith in British iaw or
how unifying law ends up in new divergencies’ (1998) 61 MLR 1 1; ADM Forte (ed)
Good Faith in Contract and Property (Hart Publishing Oxford 1999); R Brownsword,
NJ Hird and G Howells (edd) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (Dart
mouth Publishing Co Aldershot 1999); O Lando and H Beale Principies ofEuropean
Contract Law (Kluwer Law International The Hague London Boston 2000) 1 13-9;
R Zimmerrnann and 8 Whittaker (edd) Good Faith in European Contract Law (CUP
Cambridge 2000).
100 Chapman v I-Ionig [1963] 2 QB 502 (CA) 520 (Pearson LJ), Lord Denning MR
dissenting. See also Jones v Swansea CC [1990) 1 WLR 54 (CA), reversed on the facts
but not on the iaw in [1990] 1 WLR 1453 (HL).
101 [19621 AC 413 (HL) 430. See, however, Gator Shipping Corp v Trans-Asiatic Ou
Ltd SA (The Odenfeid) [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 357, 373 and Ciea Shipping Corp v Buik
Ou Internationai (The Aiaskan Trader) (No 2) [1984j 1 Ali ER 129, 136-137 for the
proposition that a party wil not be allowed to recover the fuil contract price whene
ver his behaviour in keeping the contract alive was ‘wholly unreasonable’ and there
fore against general equitable principies. And see Staughton LJ’s remarks in Stocznia
Gdanska SÃ v Latvian Shipping Co [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 132 (CÁ) 138-139, which can
be said to amount to an acknowledgrnent of the requirement of good faith in con
tractual performance. See 56-57 be1ow
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question that should therefore have been asked is: does P have the right to per
forrn his part of the contract?
D. YET ANOTHER HIDDEN ASSUMPTION
In the classic anticipatory breach situation, the party who expresses his
intention not to perform his part of the contract is clearly in breach of con
tract (whether it be an operative or an inoperative breach of contract102).
Nonetheless, in those cases where P’s performance is supposed to precede R’s,
it seems perfectly plausible for one to anticipate that R might on occasion wish
to prevent P from performing his part of the contract without at the sarne
time trying to terminate the whole contract in order to duck out of his own
contractual duties in the process. What if, rather than refusing to perforrn his
own part of the contract, R rnerely expresses the wish not to endure P’s per
formance? What if, rather than an invitation to rescind, his words or conduct
rnerely spell out a desire to reject the benefit of the contract, a determination
to renounce his right to demand the other party’s services whilst keeping the
contract alive? Why do the courts always assurne that whenever sorneone
expresses a wish that something not be done, that behaviour must be regarded
as repudiatory?
So far the courts have indiscriminatingly characterised every attempt on
R’s part to hinder P’s performance as a straightforward case of repudiation,
which is to say as an actual or potential breach of contract — a civil wrong.
They have never taken any time to consider the possibiity that in some cases
it might make sense for them to recognise R’s right to decide not to accept the
benefit ofthe contract. Accordingly, no matter how objectionable P’s conduct
might in any given case have been, the courts have obstinately treated him
as ‘the innocent party’, leaving poor R no choice but to play the role of the
villain — the 103 Such is the effect of yet another of their hidden
assumptions.
102 The idea that the repudiation only becomes an operative breach of contract
once the other party has accepted it has generally had the acceptance of the courts,
despite its flagrant technical shortcomings. See Tredegar Iron & Coal Co v Hawthorn
Bros á Co (1902) 18 TLR 716 (CA) 716; I-Ieyman v Darwins [1942] AC 356 (HL) 382.
103 For two very enlightening examples of the sort of behaviour 1 am ailuding to
see Rockingharn County v Luten Bridge (1929) 35 F 2d 301, where a bridge was erected
iii the midst of a forest, and Clea Shipping Corp v Bulk Ou international (The Alaskan
Trader) (No 2) [1984] 1 Mi ER 129, where a ship was senselessly repaired and then
kept fülly crewed and ready to sail for the duration of the charter.
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At this stage, it is only fair to concede that whenever R has lost all interest
in P’s performance he wffl be rnuch more likely to repudiate the contract than
to try and stop P from performing whilst keeping the contract aljve. However,
my point is that up to the present the courts’ obsession with the unlawful
aspects of R’s behaviour has kept them from looking elsewhere in search of
alternative approaches to the problem i.mder consideration even.in those cases
where the wrongfulness of such behaviour was beyond dispute.
In other words, even where the courts’ assumption as to the wrongfulness
of R’s conduct happens to be correct, that does not mean they should be com-
pelled to ignore his averred ioss of interest in P’s performance. That is, just
because R cannot be allowed to terminate the contract without P’s assent it
does not automatically follow that his conduct should be wholly devoid of
effect. Generaliy speaking, as welI as attempting to terminate the contract R
will also be Ietting P know that he has lost all interest in the services he is about
to provide. Those two aspects of one and the sarne conduct are different and
should therefore be dealt with separately. As to the latter — P’s awareness ofthe
uselessness of his own future performance —, its relevance should depend on
the answer to a sngIe question: does P have the rght to perform his part •of
the contract?
E. THE RJGHT TO RENOUNCE THE BENEFIT OF A CONTRACT
Earlier 011 ifl this dissertation it was submitted that P’s right to perform his
own part ofthe contract should not be universally predetermined, for its exis
tence should rather depend on the precise circumstances ofthe case before the
court, and on the proper construction of the contract under scrutiny. Once
this submission has been accepted, it should then follow that, whenever one
reaches the conclusion that in .any given case P has not in fact secured such
a right, he should nt be allowed to wholly disregard R’s professed loss ofinte
rest in the services he is about to supply only because he happens to be able to
render them without R’s cooperation.
Indeed, should R be recognised the opportunity to bargain for a right to
reject P’s performance, it is only logical that he shouid be allowed to do so
regardless of whether he is actually able to prevent P from performing by
withdrawing his cooperation. At this stage one begins to realise that the whole
affair of cooperation and the 1•ack thereofis in fact quite incidental to the pro
biem under analysis. Should one accept that in any given case it is possible for
R to have secured the discretionary power to release P from his duty to supply
his services by refusing to cooperate, and for P to have agreed to be under the
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correlative liability to have R thus wipe out his duty at wffl, there is absolutely
no reason not to accept that R’s position must be equally protected in those
cases where for some reason his cooperation is not required.
To put it more clearly, whenever R has secured for himself the right to
reject P’s performance P has conversely relinquished the right to perform his
own part of the contract. The two rights are irreconcilabie, in that they are
diarnetrically opposed. The question that should then be asked, as a simple
matter of construction, is as follows: upon entering the contract, has R sacri
ficed his control over the decision whether to get the beneflt of the contract?
This aspect of contracting has so far been kept pretty obscure. One should
not, however, underestimate the importance of retaining some control over
the outcome of the contractual enterprise at every step of the way. For ins
tance, a soap manufacturer who contracts with an advertising agency to
advertise a soon-to-be-released soap but later discovers one of its components
to be momentarily out of stock, which forces him to postpone its release,
would be more than willing to prevent the agency from displaying their
adverts ali over the country. But would he have secured the power to do so at
the contracting stage?
Ultimateiy, therefore, it aU comes down to a single question: does P have
the right to perform his own part ofthe contract? The parties to a contract wffl
usuaily not have expressly discussed this matter. Hence when construing the
contract one must iook for what has remained unsaid. One should always bear
in mmd that there are at ieast two sides to every bargain, and that as a result
there is no necessary correiation between a duty to perform and a right to per
form. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases P would have absoiutely no direct
interest in actually performing his part of the contract.104 Such correlation
wouId only make sense reflexiveiy, that is, in order to secure a right to the
counter-performance. Once disentangied that link,’°5 howevei there is no
reason to recognise such a right — uniess, of course, P’s actual performance
is part of the agreed consideration, as in the leading actor 106 Tu ali
other cases it would be pointless for P to be recognised the right to perform
his part of the contract.
It is therefore submitted that, unless a court is satisfied that a right to per
form was effectively part of the bargain under scrutiny, R should be recogni
104 See ML Pereira conceito de Prestação e Destino da Contraprestação (Almedina
Coimbra 2001) 222-223.
105 See 41-42 above for the submission that in most cases should R fail to coope
rate he wffl still be liable for the füll contract price, inasmuch as P did not take upon
hirnself the risk of such lack of cooperation.
106 See 39 above.
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sed both the right to renounce the benefit of the contract and the correspon
ding power to prevent P from performing merely by giving him due notice of
his Ioss ofinterest.107This is the only solution that effectively protects R’s best
interests in ali those cases where no cooperation on his part is needed in order
for P to perforrn, iii that it fully acknowledges the significance of retaining
some control over the benefit of a bargain after it has been agreed upon. But
it would obviously apply to every factual situation regardless of whether R’s
cooperation would or would not be required in order for P to perform bis part
of the contract.
E PREVENTION BY NOTIFICATION
Indeed, should R’s right to renounce the benefit of the contract be accep
ted by the courts, it should logically foiow that, in any given factual situation,
once R has effectively exercised such a right by duly notifying P ofhis decision
not to accept his services the latter will immediately cease to be capable ofper
forming his part ofthe contract as it originally stood. This will be so regardless
of whether he is physicaily able to supply his services without R’s coopera-
tion,108 for R’s power to prevent P’s performance operates on a purely con
ceptual basis. That is to say, once the renunciation has taken place, ‘perfor
mance’ of that particular contractual promise wffl automatically cease to be
possible, insofar as, whichever course of action P decides to take — most par-
ticularly whether or not he chooses to do the thing which is the subject-mat
ter of that promise — his conduct wffl no longer be susceptible of being cha
racterised as that promise’s performance.
Such is R’s power to prevent P from performing his part of the contract
— it does not entitie nor require him to physically stop P from rendering his
services, it rather operates by conceptualiy doing away with P’s ability to
107 On prevention by words see Cort and Gee v The Ambergate (1851) 17 QB 127.
‘[Mjay 1 not reasonably say that 1 was prevented from completing a contract by being
desired not to complete it? Are there no means of preventing an act from being done,
except physical force or brute violence?’ Sarne case 145 (Lord Campbell CJ).
108 This une of argument is just as valid when it comes to those cases where P
cannot perform due to R’s Iack of cooperation where, even before that cooperation
is lacking, R may inform P that he is no longer interested in hjs services, thereby
ensuring that any future action on P’s part will not be characterised as directed
towards performance, and consequently wii not be considered when it comes to cal-
cuiating P’s expenses. That notice alone should be enough to successfully prevent any
further ‘performance’ of the contract on P’s part.
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perform’. As ofthe moment the right to renounce the benefit ofthe contract
is exercised, performance of the contractual promise in question simply
becomes legally impossible. Hence even in those cases where R cannot
physically prevent P’s supply of services he will stil be able to prevent him
from legally ‘performing’ his part of the contract — though this does not
mean that the contract has come to an end. Needlless to say, after exercising
his right of renunciation R will prima facie stil be liable for the fuli contract
price.
In those cases where R has decided to renounce the benefit ofthe contract
merely because he has lost ali interest in P’s services and wishes to prevent the
latter from incurring any further redundant expense on the contract, his posi
tion will be fully protected by the suggested conceptual solution. Whichever
course of action P chooses to take, his expenditure will as of that moment
cease to be connected to that particular contract, thus shall not be taken into
consideration in any subsequent calculation of P’s contractual expenses.
Nonetheless, because R’s powers of prevention are of a purely conceptual
nature and so do not interfere with P’s chosen course of (physical) action, in
ali those cases where P can effectually render his services without R’s coopera-
tion there is still one issue in need of attention: whenever R’s decision to
renounce the benefit of the contract stems from his fear that the object of P’s
performance may turn out to be a nuisance or even injure his own best inte
rest he wiil be in definite need of further protection.109When this be the case,
should P choose to disregard R’s renunciation and go ahead wjth ‘perfor
mance’ against R’s wil the latter must at the very least be allowed to ask the
. courts for an injunction. And there is certainly room for the view that P’s
. behaviour — should he choose to ‘perform’ — might properly be deemed
fu’° However, the length ofthis dissertation does not allow me to ela-
borate any further on this matter.
109 Take the case ofthe soap example (see 51 above).
110 Should an injunction not be granted in due time, he would th.en be held liable
for whichever harm R may come to suffer as a direct result of P’s actions. P’s conduct
might be characterised as a breach ofcontract. Alternatively, P might be held liable for
a breach of his duty of care towards R. Ultimately, P might be held liable for perfor
ming even in those cases where R has not yet had a chance to actively and properly
renounce the beneflt of the contract. His awareness of the damaging potential of his
future performance should suffice, at least as far as the tort ofnegligence is concerned.
It should be noted, however, that as my position currently stands P is only required to
take notice of R’s will — once expressed — not of his best interest.
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G. ‘No LEGITIMATE INTEREST, FINANCIAL OR OTHERWISE’
At this stage it rnight be useful to take a closer Iook at a certain passage
from Lord Reid’s judgment iii the White & Carter case in which he hints at
what has later become known as the legitirnate interest qualification to the
innocent party’s right to perform. Indeed, one of the premises on which my
thesis is grounded is the submission that in a large number ofcases P wffl have
no interest in actualiy performing his part of the contract other than that of
reflexively securing his right to the fuil contract price. And yet, when dealing
wit:h this qualification, both judges and academics seem to share the view that
oniy in the rarest and most peculiar ofcases will the innocent party have abso
lutely no legitimate interest in performing the 1 1 Ii fact, in this
country such an allegation has only been successfully pleaded, as reported,
in a couple of shipping 12 This is indeed a startling state of affairs, for
one would think that the sort of questions that would be asked in order to
determine whether P has a legitimate interest in performing cannot greatly
differ ftom the ones that 1 have been putting forward as a ineans offinding out
whether P should be recognised the right to perform in the first piace.”3
A careful analysis of their arguments seenis to be in order.
It rnay well be that, ifit can be shown that a person has no legitimate interest,
financial or otherwise, in performing the contract rather than ciaiming damages,
he ought not to be allowed to saddle the other party with an additional burden
with no benefit to himself. . . . [HJe ought not to be allowed to penalse the other
party by taking one course when another is equally advantageous to i14
Such were Lord Reid’s observations in the White & Carter case, which seve
ral commentators have fittingly described as being uncharacteristically vague
and imprecise.115Nonetheless, Lord Reid appears to sustain the view that even
111 See Gator Shipping Corp v Trans-Asiatic Gil Ltd SA (The Odenfeld) [ 1978j 2
Lloyd’s Rep 357, 374 and Clea Shipping Corp v Bulk Ou International (The Alaskan
Trader) (No 2) [1984] 1 Mi ER 129, 137.
1 12 See Attica Sea Carriers Corp v Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Rederei (The Puerto Bui
trago) [1976j 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250 (DA) and lea Shipping Gorp vBulk Oillnternational
Ltd (The Alaskan Trader) (No 2) [1984) 1 Ali ER 129.
1 13 Except that 1 have clearly stated this to be a matter of construction — hence one
that belongs in the chapter ofthe formation ofcontracts — whereas it could be argued
that a ‘legitirnate interest’ ofthe sort alluded to by Lord Reid might well be shaped at
a later stage ofthe events.
114 White & Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] AC 413 (HL) 431.
115 See JW Cartei A Phang and SY Phang ‘Performance following repudiation:
legal and economic interests’ (1999) 15 JCL 97, 107-116; LJ Priestley cConduct after
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though in principie P must be allowed to perform his own part ofthe contract
whenever he can do so without R’s cooperation his right to 16 must
give way whenever the foliowing two requisites are rnet: (i) P must have no
‘legitirnate interest’ in performing his part of the contract, whatever that
rneans; and (ii) there rnust be at least some disparity between the scale of any
advantages that P rnight derive from performing (which logically do not
amount to a legitimate interest) and that of the hardship which would be
inflicted upon R should he be forced to endure such performance.
Nowhere in his judgment does Lord Reid expiam the concept oflegitimate
interest. In fact, the only conclusion that can safely be drawn from his lords
hip’s own words is that he rnust have meant to refer to the absence of any legi
timate interest other than his interest in clairning the contract price rather
than damages for breach of contract. Nonetheless, and even though such a
concept has with one exception117 just about monopoiised the attention of
every judge and academic who has ever come across Lord Reid’s statement,
it is my belief that the key element ofhis proposition is the latter of those two
requirernents — namely the existence of some disparity between the relative
weight ofthe parties’ ciaims to performance (or non-performance, as the case
may be) — insofar as, at the end of the day, that disparity has revealed itself to
be the decisive factor in the bulk of the cases that so far have come before the
Engiish courts.
Indeed if one takes into consideration those rare cases where P’s claim to
the fuli contract price was not allowed, one is immediately stricken by the rea
lisation that what those factual situations have in common — which has pre
dominantly tempted the courts into accepting R’s contention that he is not
breach: the position ofthe party not in breach’ (1990-91) 3 JCL 218, 225;PM Niena
ber ‘The effect of anticipatory repudiation: principie and policy’ [1962] CLJ 213, 231;
MP Furmston CTh case ofthe insistent performer’ (1962) 25 MLR 364, 367; ‘The rule
in White & Carter (Coundils) Ltd v McGregor’ — a report by the Contracts and Com-
mercial Law Reform Committee, presented to the New Zeaiander Minister of Justice
on 5 May 1983 (New Zealand Law Society) 13. See also Decro-Wall International SA
v Practitioners in Marketing [1971] 1 WLR 361 (CA) 370, where the very existence of
the so-cailed legitimate interest qualification was seriously doubted.
1 16 Either his right to perform or, should one follow an alternative interpretation
of his lordship’s words, the range of remedies at his disposaL See Decro- Wall Interna-
tional SA v Practitioners in Marketing [ 1971] 1 WLR 36 1 (CA) 375; 1-fui v CA Parsons
& Co [1972] 1 Ch 305 (CA); Clea Shipping Corp v Bulk Gil International (Tire Alaskan
Trader) (No 2) [1984] 1 Ali ER 129, 137.
117 That ofeconornic waste. See PM Nienaber ‘The effect of anticipatory repudia-
tion: principie and policy’ [1962] CLJ 213, 227, 231; JW Carter Breach of tontract
(2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell London 1991) 1128.
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liable for the fuil contract price — is the fact that P’s conduct has given rise to
an outrageous instance of economic loss, as well as amounting to a pure
waste of time and resources whenever the end result is something which is of
no value to anybody»8In the White & Carter case, on the other hand, not
only was the respondents’ loss not that impressive, the waste issue was also
not that obvious either.’19What separates these cases from each other is the
refore not so much the legitimacy of P’s interest in performing — which was
fairly equivalent in ali the cases — but rather the magnitude of the loss he
wouid be inflicting on R should he be made to pay him the fuli contract price,
as weil as the corresponding waste of resources such performance amounts
to.120 In other words, and despite what the courts have been saying, in any
given case the final decision will pretty much hinge on the strength of R’s (or
society’s) ciaims to non-performance — not on the fflegitimacy of P’s interest
in performing.
1 believe this element of Lord Reid’s proposition can safely be said to be
very closely related to the requirement of good faith in the performance of
fl8 Hence in Clea Shipping Corp v Bulk Ou International (The Alaskan Trader)
(No 2) [1984J 1 Mi ER 129 a ship chartered to the defendants for a period ofappro
ximately two years was returned to the claimants in repudiation of the time charter
at the end of the first year because it was in need of extensive repairs. The latter
nevertheless chose to repair the ship and keep it fully crewed and ready to sail
throughout the remainder of the stipulated time. And in Attica Sea Carriers Corp
1? Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Rederei (The Puerto Buitrago) [ 1976) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250
(CA), another shipping case (whose factualsituation did not, however, rigorously
speaking, raise any of the problems that concern this dissertation), where the char
terers of a ship returned it without the requisite repairs because they would have
cost more than the repaired ship would have been worth. See also Lord Keith’s Hong
Kong expert example in the White and Carter case (at 442). For an equally im
pressive American case, see Rockingham County v Luten Bridge (1929) 35 F 2d 301
(see n 103 above).
119 See AL Diamond ‘Commerce, customers and contracts’ (1978) 1 1 Me1ULRev
563, 574-6 for the submission that the appellants in the White & Carter case did not
infiate their loss by performing rather than accepting the respondents’ repudiation
and claiming damages inasmuch as they were ‘lost volume sellers’ and could not the
refore have re,let the space to any other dient. See 65 below.
120 A more communitarian approach would lay more stress on the waste factor,
whereas a more individualistic approach such as my own would tend to highlight the
loss factor. Note that, should one’s major goal be the avoidance ofwaste, the solution
to the problem under analysis must vary according to whether the contract is still
wholly executory, partly executory or wholly executed. If one’s main concern is the
rejection of unwanted services, however, it should not make much difference what
stage of the process one happens to be at.
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contraCtS’2’2— an aspect which has since been reinforced by Staughton
LJ’s unambiguous statement in Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latviai-i Shipping
Co123 that the innocent party must have reasonable grounds for keeping the
contraCt open bearing in mmd also the interests of the wrongdoet’ ‘ 24 I-Iowe-
ver, as has been previously pointed out, the whole of this approach is built
on the assurnptiofl that there is a right to perforrn which is susceptible of
being abused.
Thus we are back to where we started from, that is, the question whether P
has a right to perform his own part of the contract. For only where he does
would it make sense for one to question the legitimacy ofits exercise under the
circurnstaflCeS of the case before the court. In order for Lord Reid’s qualifica-
tion to be of any use here, one should then focus on p’s supposed legitimate
interests in performing, rather than at R’s — or society’s — interests in hinde
ring his performance. As for the formei the one interest that has frequently
been brought to the attention of the courts is that of the difficulty of assessing
damages — or of their adequacy — should P relinquish his claim to the fuil con
121 How this approach can properly be reconciled with Lord Reid’s earlier disap
provai of the suggestion that a person rnust exercise his contractual rights in a reaso
nable way (see 47-48 above) is a somewhat delicate question. Later attempts at such
reconciliation appear to have settled on the adoption of a distinction between what
constitutes ‘bi behaviour’ and ‘wholly unreasonable behaviour’ See Gator
Shipping Corp 1’ Trans-Asiatic Ou Ltd SA (77w Odenfeld) [ 1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 357, 373
and Cica Shipping Corp v Bulk Ou International (The Alaskan Trader) (No 2) [ 1984j
1 All ER 129, 136-137.
1 22 In fact Lord Reid’s observations strongly resembie one particular instance of
the German doctrine of the inadmissible exercise of legal rights (die unzultissige
Rechtsausübung). See K Larenz and M Wolf Aligerneiner Teu des bürgerlichen Rechts
(8th edn CH Beck Munich 1997) 322-330. ‘Em berechtigtes Eigeninteresse fehlt auch
bei geringfügiger 1nteressenbeeintrtchtigung, wenn durch die Rechtsausübung ande-
ren unverhi1tnismaEige Nachteile entstehen.’ Sarne book 328 (A legitirnate interest
is also iacking whenever the negligible benefits one would derive from the exercise of
a right are disproportionately outweighed by the serious disadvantages its exercise
would inflict in others.’). See also kM Cordeiro Da Boa Fé no Direito Civil (reprint
Almedina Coimbra 1997) 853.
123 [1996} 2 Lloyd’s Rep 132 (CA).
]24 Sarne case 139. Lord Reid’s dictum has also been applied or approved in Attica
Sea Carriers Corp v Ferrostaal Foseidon Bulk Rederei (The Puerto Buitrago) [1976]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 250 (CA); Gator Shipping Corp v Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd SA (The Oden
feld) [ 1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 357; and Clea Shipping Corp v Bulk Ou International (Tire
Alaskan Trader) (No 2) [1984] 1 Ali ER 129, where it was said — again using language
which is strongiy evocative of good faith — that ‘there comes a point at which the
Court wili cease, on general equitabie principies, to allow the innocent party to
enforce his contract according to its strict legal terrns’ (at 136).
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tract price.125 That argument, however, does not apply because the present
study supports the recognltion of P’s right to claim the fuil contract price.
A few of the cases support the view that P’s interest in performing wffl be
deemed legitimate whenever he has entered into commitments with third par-
ties which he must honour as a matter of business.126 li has further been
argued, in a sornewhat connected way, that the interest in protecting one’s own
reputation should be considered a legitimate one.127 But these submissions
seem here somewhat misplaced, given that they deal with a situation where P
has already relied on the contract — whether by taking some steps towards per
formance or simplyby making futrther engagements on the supposition that the
contract would be completed — sornething which brings forth an entirely diffe
rent set ofissues which cannot possibly be appropriately handled in the context
of a study that is mostly concerned with the proper construction of a contract
and which .therefore must focus on the contract itself and the circumstances
that surround its inception, rather than on what takes place afterwards.
As far as the protection of one’s own reputation is concerned, however,
whenever the problem derives from the fact that P will no longer be able to
enhance it amongst his peers by performing his part of the contract — such as
in the leading actor type of case128 — then either performance of that parti-
cular task is actually part of the consideration (as in the example only just
mentioned) or it should not be taken into consideration at ali, for such an
enhancement was something which had not been bargained for at the time of
contracting. It could also be a matter of the particular way in which R exer
cises his right to reject performance — which can sureiy be exercised in an
unconscionable way, insofar as the right to renounce the benefit of the con
tract is surely as susceptible ofbeing abused as any.
125 See Gator • Shipping Corp v Trans-Asiatic Ou Ltd SA (The Odenfeld) [1978]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 357, 374. See also George Barker (Transport) Ltd v Eynon [1974] 1 WLR
462 (CA) and Atticci Sea Carriers Corp v Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Rederei (The Puerto
Buitrago) [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250 (CA) 255-256. See GH Treitel The Law ofContract
(lOth edn Sweet & Maxwell London 1999) 946.
126 See Anglo-African Shipping v 1 Mortner [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 81, 94 (affirmed
on other grounds at 610), where the example of an innocent party who had entered
into various sub-contracts — such as taking shipping space in order to ship the goods
to their agreed destination — for the purpose of performing his contract was given;
and Gator Shipping Corp v Trans-Asiatic Ou Ltd SA (The Odenfeld) [1978] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep 357, 374, where the shipowners had assigned to a third party hire due under the
charterparty.
127 See above n 126. See the arguments of counsel for the claimants in the White
Carter case (at 418, 420, 425).
128 See39.above.
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In the end, therefore, 1 reiterate my initial submission that in a significant
number of cases P will not have any direct interest in performing his part of
the contract, given that whichever advantages he might derive from perfor—
mance quite simply were not part ofthe bargain. R must not be held liable for
the entire chain of events that completion of that contract would set in
motion.129 He should only have to answer for those events for whose occur
rence he has in some way accepted responsibiity. Ali things. considered this is)
once again, a matter of risk-allocation and of the proper construction of each
individual contract
CHAPTER IV
DEDUCTING FROM THE FULL CONTRACT PRICE
A. THE NEED FOR A DEDUCTION
The situation of the contractual party who loses ali interest in the other
party’s performance and accordingly decides to reject the benefit of the con
tract is in serious need of a separate and independent legal solution. Our star-
ting point is that the contract is still in force, and that since the risk of R’s loss
of interest is borne entirely by him he is still prima facie liable for the fuli con
tract price.’30 As a result P has at his disposal an action in debt — a claim ex
contractu which (it is settled law) does not presuppose a breach of contract in
its inception.131 Nonetheless, it is my beliefthat in this situation R should not
be made to pay the fuli contract price. He should be allowed to deduct from
the contract price whichever sums P has saved or otherwise made as a conse
quence ofhis release from the duty to perforrn his part of the contract.
129 Somewhat in support ofthis statement, albeit in the context ofdetermining the
right measure of expectation damages, see the recent decision of the House of Lords
in South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague [1997] AC 191 which
introduced the technique ofdefining the boundaries of contractual liabiity by means
of a rigorous construction of the scope of the duties each party has undertaken upon
entering the contract, that is to say, by a thorough analysis ofthe risks that have been
assumed by each ofthe parties as part of their bargain.
130 Compare K Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts 1 (14 edn CH Beck’sche Verlags
buchhandlung Munich 1987) 399-402; RI Faria A mora do credor (Lex Lisboa 2000)
32-38. Guilt is not at stake here, given that the discharge is simply attributed to the
prornisee as the person whose lawful conduct was responsible for its event.
131 See Marks v Lilley [1959) 1 WLR 749.
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In the flrst place, making R pay for the fuli contract price would be an
extremely inefficient solution. Whenever P’s performance can actually be
damaging to R’s interest the question does not arise, for as has been said before
under these circumstances R should be allowed to ask the courts for an injunc
tion.132 j every other case, however, if one allows P to go ahead and physi—
cally supply his unwanted services to R — despite them not being characterised
as performance of the contract — this wffl amount to a senseless squander
of both human and material resources, to a pure waste of time and money.
Thinking in terms of efficiency only, in order to persuade P not to go ahead
and supply his services to R one should try to flnd a way of promoting the
most rational behaviour by both contractual parties, that is, one should
endeavour to come up with a solution that encourages both P’s inactivity and
R’s early notice of his loss of interest — his early renunciation. The only way of
doing that is by providing R with a financial incentive to renunciation: every
thing that P saves through his inactivity R is allowed to deduct from the fuil
contract price.
Moreover, one should take into account the general policy against over
compensation. Indeed, even though P’s right to the fuli contract price consists
in his primary contractual right to the agreed counter-performance’33,the
context in which this right is being asserted is functionally different from the
original one. That is, with payment of the price one is aiming at putting P in
the position he would have been in had he duly supplied his services to R,
rather than at rewarding him for the actual performance of those services.134
There is no fiction of performance in this solution, there is rather the purpose
of compensating P from his non-performance — hence the deduction.
Til a few words, even though P is still recognised the right to the counter
performance, insofar as the contract is stil in force, that right is performing a
compensatory ftnction riow. So the principle of indemnity and the policy
against over-compensation come unto play. As a result, the expectation mea
sure of damages becomes relevant, though purely as an upper limit, because P
should not end up being better offthan he would have been had he duly per
formed his part of the contract.135 Hence P’s right to the contract price must
132 See 53 above.
133 See Lord Diplock’s explanation of the difference between primary and secon
dary obligations in Photo Froduction Ltd v Securicor Transport {1980j AC 827 (HL).
134 Compare MLPereira conceito de Prestação e Destino da Contraprestação (Álme
djna Coimbra 2001) 234.
135 This policy against over-compensation can be said to derive from a principie
ofunjust enrichment by prevention, whatever its usefuiness may be. Tu Banque Finan
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be curtailed in order to give effect to such a policy. Everything that he has in
fact saved through his non-performance must be taken into account and
deducted from the fuil amount he would have received had he duly performed
his part of the contract.
B. How TO DEDUCT: MITIGATION
At this point the doctrine ofmitigation can properly be reintroduced. Why
exactly did the mtigation rules not apply in an action in debt? lt is commonly
said that they do not apply because there was no breach of contract.136 This
criterion may, generally speaking, work relatively well as a rule of thumb. And
in the standard case it is indisputably the breach that effectively triggers the
application of those rules. However, the absence of a breach of contract is, in
itself, wholly irrelevant to this problem. The significant factor is the non
-compensatory nature of the available remedy. Indeed, what prevents the
mitigation rules from being applied here is the fact that an action in debt is
aimed at enforcing the defendant’s primary contractual obligations, rather
cière de la Cité v Parc (Battersect) [1999] AC 221 (HL), ‘Lord Hoffmann proposed a fra
mework under which the principie of unjust enrichment is the basis of two species
of right: flrst, rights which operate to reverse unjust enrichment; and secondiy,
rights which prevent or pre-ernpt an unjust enrichment.’ R Williams ‘Preventing
unjust enrichrnent’ [20001 RLR 492, 492. Lord Hoffmann’s speech is consistent with
the view that the principie of unjust enrichment may generate remedies other than
restitution. By way ofiiustration, one could think ofthe decision in Inchbald v Wes
tem Neilgherry Coffee, etc, Co (1864) 17 CB (NS) 733. To the extent that there is evi
dence of a principie of indemnity in English law, that principie would appear to be
given effect by a simple reduction of the claimant’s damages. There are dicta to the
effect that it also appiies to damages for breach of contract. See I-Iopkins v Norcros
Plc [1993] 1CR 1 1 (CA) 14 (Staughton LJ). See sarne articie 504; A Burrows The Law
ofRestitution (Butterworths London 1993) 80 and Understanding the Law ofObliga
tions:. Essays on Contract, Tort and Restitution (Hart Publishing Oxford 1998) 188;
c Mitchell ‘Subrogation, unjust enrichrnent and remedial flexibiity’ [1998j RLR
144, text to n 9; S Degeling ‘Carer’s ciairns: unjust enrichrnent and tort’ [2000] RLR
172, 185-187.
136 See Shindler v Northern RaincoatLtd [1960] 1 WLR 1038, 1048; Brown v Mui-
ler (1872) LR 7 Exch 3 19; Tredegctr Iron á Coal Co v Hawthorn Bros Co (1902) 18
TLR 716 (CA). See WED Davies ‘Anticipatory breach and rnitigation of darnages’
(1960-62) 5 UWAusLRev 576, 690; E Tabachnilc Anticipatory breach of contract’
[1972) 25 CLP 149, 164; F Dawson Metaphors and anticipatory breach of contract’
[1981j CLJ 83, 105.
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than at compensating the claimant for the loss he suffered as a result of the
defendant’s non-performance.’37
To be sure, niitigation is mitigation ofloss. Whenever the concept ofloss is
irrelevant, what is there to mitigate? In this case, however, even though there
was no breach of contract propei there is definitely an element of compensa-
tion in the claimant’s rernedy. As said before, the award of the contract price
is aimed at putting P in the position he would have been in had he duly sup
piied his services to R, rather than at rewarding him for the actual perfor
mance of those services. Therefore, the expectation measure becomes rele
vant, and so does the concept of loss (or the lack thereof). Moreover, given
that there was no breach of contract, R’s interest deserves even more protec
tion than a wrongdoer’s; it would make absolutely no sense to limit an award
of darnages for breach of contract by resorting to the ruies of mitigation and
not being able to do the same in the case of someone whose conduct was in
every aspect perfectly Iawful.
Since the general idea is that P should not end up being better off than he
would have been had he duly rendered his services to R, one must compare the
position he would have occupied had performance taken place with the posi
tion he would been in should he be awarded the fuil contract price. In other
words, one must determine exactly how much he has saved and how much he
has otherwise profited from his inactivity in order to deduct that sum from
the fufi contract price, so as not to leave P in a better position than he would
have occupied had he duly performed his part of the contract.
At the outset, we are dealing here with the concept of mitigation in fact.
There is here no question of a ‘duty’ to behave reasonably, since what matters
is how much P has in fact saved by non-performing. However, should P not
have behaved reasonably, should he have gone ahead and supplied his services
to R, whatever he failed to save must not be taken into account — it must not
be characterised as constituting an expense in any way related to performance
of his contractual obligations.’38By way of illustration, should the contract
have been for the supply of a kitchen table, ifP went ahead and effectively built
a kitchen table, that fact must be deemed wholly irrelevant; legally he must be
deemed to have saved the expense of building a kitchen table for the perfor
137 See British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co v Underground Electric
Riys ofLondon [1912] AC 673 (HL) 689; Jamal (AKAS) v Moolia Dawood, Sons á Co
[1916] 1 AC 175 (PC) 179; Banco de Portugal v Waterlow and Sons [1932] AC 452
(HL); Dunkirk Colliery Co v Lever [1878] 9 Ch Div 20 (CÁ).
138 See n 1 10 above as to P’s potential liability in damages towards R, both in con
tract and in tort.
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mance ofthat contract. Hence he shall have to bear that loss himself. Additio
nally, the value of the table he has ended up with or the profit he makes out of
selling it should be taken into account as alternative profits clirectly flowing
from his release.
Does this amount to a burden to niitigate? Actually, all that P does after R’s
notification sirnply cannot be characterised as performance, so we do not
count it as an expense that related to performing the contract. However, one
could say that the concept of burden also applies here. R has notified P of his
loss of interest in his services, and thereby he has given him the opportunity
of avoiding any (further) detriment to himself. The choice is therefore his to
decide whether to take this opportunity or not, assuming this is not one of
those cases where ‘performance’ has become unlawful. Shouid he choose to
‘perform’, he must bear the expenses himself. Seen in this Iight, this does
amount to a burden to mitigate loss.
c. Ti-u WAY TO DO IT: TRANSACTION SET-OFF
The technical device of set-off is the best way to deduct from the fuil con
tract price both the amount of money P has saved and what he has otherwise
profited from his inactivity. 1 shall resort to the terminology adopted by Wood
in his work139 and cail the device here discussed transaction set-off. According
to this author, transaction set-off rnay be resorted to whenever reciprocal
claims arise out of the sarne or a closely connected transaction, and inciudes
both abatement and equitable set-off.’40 Although the distinction between
both these forms of transaction set-off has received sanction from the House
of Lords, the differences between them are increasingly slight141, therefore
1 shall henceforth limit myself to the broader concept without distinguishing
which of the two specific devices 1 am referring to.
139 PR Wood English and International Set-off(Sweet & Maxwell London 1989).
For a thorough explanation of the concept of transaction set-off see the aforementio
ned book, particularly No 4.
140 to abatement, see Aries Tanker Corp v Total TransportLtd [1977] 1 WLR 185
(HL) and GilbertAsh (Northern) Ltd vModern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd [1974] AC 689
(HL). This device is traditionally restricted to contracts for the saie of goods or for
workorlabour. As to equitable set-offsee Hanak v Green [19581 2 QB 9 (CA) and Bri
tish Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Mcirine Management (UK) Ltd [1980]
1 QB 137.




In Wood’s own words, ‘[t]he main policy underlying transaction set-off is
that a creditor should not be able to claim payment for something which he
has not done in breach ofhis obligation to the debtor42However, d[w]hether
a debtor may set offa cross-claim arising out ofthe transaction against his cre
ditor’s primary claim where the creditor is not in default is unclear143 The
basis of transaction set-off seems to be fairness to the debtor. In the situation
under analysis we merely wish to prevent P from claiming the fuil contract
price, ven though he is in no way in breach of contract. li is my belief that in
this case transaction set-off should be available to R, given that the sarne
policy of avoiding the over-imbursernent of the creditor is at playJ44
of course, in the situation under analysis, transaction set-off would be
available to R rnerely as a defence, not as a cross-claim. There would be no
need for the recognition of an independent claim by R over P’s savings and
profits; R’s remedy only makes sense as a cap to his contractual debt to P. In
other words, R does not owe P the fuil contract price, subject to a separate
and independent cross-clairn which would involve a deduction to that fali
contract price if exercised in the sarne action. What R owes P is a single
arnount which has already been subject to the deduction in question. This
deduction can be operated in court or by way of seif-help, therefore R shali
not have to pay the fuli contract price whether the case is dealt with judi
cially or extra-judicialiy.
Finally, there is stii the matter of the burden of proof to be deait with.
Cieariy all P rnust do is ciaim his right to the contract price. This much stems
from the need to protect his contractual expectations. It wffl be up to R to
prove that he has the right to the deduction in qifstion, that is, it wffl be up
to him to satisfy the court that, due to his having notified P of his Ioss of inte
rest, P has been reieased from performing his part ofthe contract. R rnust then
provide evidence as to P’s alieged saved expenses and as to any proflt he has
otherwise made. Essentially, P’s release from perforrning his part of the con
tract rnust not injure his previous standing; hence this protection shall extend
to every substantive and procedural aspect of the case.
142 Sarne book 107.
143 Sarne book 120.
144 See Bankes vJarvis [1903) 1 KB 549 (CA) and Canada Southern Rly Co vMichi
gan CentralRailroad Co (1984) 45 OR (2d) 257 for some examples oftransaction set
-off at its most liberal.
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D. WHAT IF IT IS CHEAPER TO SUPPLY TRE SERVICES THAN NOT TO?
Let us take the White á Carter case itself In this case the contract between
the advertisers and the garage owners was a renewal contract. According to
irn145 this meant that at the time of contracting the advertisements had
already been exhibited for the previous three years and were probably still out
on the Iitter bins. Therefore, it was more than Iikely that the new contract was
for the advertisers nearly ali pure profit Conversely, if they were made to abs
tain from any further performance, they wouid have to send people round
withdrawing those advertisements. Regardiess of whether this author has got
the facts of this case right, it is certainly true that in certain contracts — parti-
cularly contracts of renewal — it is clearly cheaper to go ahead and render the
agreed services than it is to abstain from such a supply. One has only to think
of the case of contracts for the supply of water or electricity where the sarne
sort of situation could occur.
In this type of situation, P would obviously not save any expenses by not
rendering his services to R, hence the latter would still be liable for the fuil
contract price — no deduction would take place. But should P be allowed to go
ahead and perforrn in order to get the sarne amount ofprofit he was counting
on? This is undoubtedly a very difficult question. On the one hand, one could
say that whenever this is the case P’s expectations would necessarily be injured
by R’s right to renounce the benefit of the contract, in which case the latter
should not be recognised. Perhaps the outcorne ofthe White & Carter case was
a fair one after all!
Alternatively, one could allow R to reject the benefit ofthe contract, provi-
ded he indemnified P for his loss of proflt. One could also argue that ali the
expenses connected to the cessation of P’s supply of services shouid be borne
entirely by him, given that generally speaking they are unavoidable, at some
time or another, and should therefore be taken into consideration when he
comes up with the contract price. At any rate in those cases where P’s supply
of services is actually potentially damaging to R’s best interest it is my belief
that the former should not be allowed to render them, whatever the conse
quences to himself. At this stage, howevei all one can aspire is to cali attention
to this problem rather than attempt to solve it.





In this dissertation 1 have set out to offer an alternative outiook on the
decision of a contractual party to reject the benefit of the contract when he is
no longer interested in the other party’s performance. 1 have attempted to jus
tify such course of action by putting forward an analysis of the situation that
does not entail its characterisation as a breach of contract.
1 have ernbarked on this project with the firm conviction that it is perfectly
reasonabl.e that someone may wish to secure a contractual right to a given ser-
vice without at the sarne time promising that he wffl accept it when the time
comes. 1 wished to find out exactly why one does not more often come across
clear instances of that frame of mmd when going over the existent case law.
1 was faced with a number of obstacles which 1 set about to overcome in order
to promote the possibility oflawfully preventing another’s performance.
The first of those obstacles was the widely spread suggestion that the com-
mon law imposes on the parties to a contract a duty to cooperate in order to
facilitate the fulfiiment of their bargain. Afrer a thorough examination of the
relevant leading cases it became apparent that the duty-based approach to
cooperation originated in an improper overgeneralization of authority that
gave rise to an unsuitably framed mie ofconstruction. lndeed, the courts see
med to have faiie•d to notice that there are other ways, over and above the
making of a promise, of bringin.g about a certain desired action by another
person.
The major shortcoming of the courts’ une of reasoning seerned to be their
constant emphasis on ‘the bargain’ as opposed to the parties’ mutual promi
ses — as if they were bound to fulfil ‘it’ rather than each other’s reasonable
expectations. Under the mistaken assumption that when concluding a con
tract the parties bind themselves to achieve one and the sarne end result, they
have erroneously concluded that (a) the parties must have an unfettered right
to perform their part of the deal free from. interference — the negative side of
cooperation; and that (b) they are under the obligation to do whatever it takes
to accompiish that end result — the positive side of cooperation. This approach
blatantly overlooks the fact that sometirnes the recognition of a right to per
forrn (and of its counterpart, the duty to cooperate) might be diametrically
opposed to what the parties themselves had intended.
After exposing the faliacy behind this approach 1 have concluded Chapter
One with the subrnission that, whereas each contractual party must have the
duty to cooperate so as not to frustrate the other party’s legitirnate contractual
expectations, when it comes to his own expectations that party is merely faced
with a choice between two alternative courses of actjon, both of which are
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iawfui: he may decide either to cooperate and fulfil his expectations or not to
cooperate and suifer the consequences of his own inactivity. 1 have further
subrnjtted that, insofar as one’s own contractual expectations are concerned,
the concept of a burden’ — rather than that of a duty — is much better sujted
to encapsulate the true meaning of the requirement of cooperation.
In Chapter Two 1 set myself the task of contestng two other popular but
misconceived assurnptions that stood in the way ofmy ultimate goal. The first
of those assumptions was the common belief that a party’s share in the con
tractual risk-allocation is restricted to the scope of his contractual promises.
This assumption was easily set aside by making clear that there are more ways
oftaking a contractual risk other than the making of a promise, first and fore
most that of resorting to the concept of condition.
Linking up with the previously outlined ‘burden’ analysis, 1 went on to
expiam that where one takes the rjsk that a certain event will take place, either
(a) the occurrence of that event is for the other party’s benefit, in which case
bearing the risk means promising that it wil happen; or (b) it is not for the
other party’s benefit, in which case bearing the risk means suffering the con
sequences ofits non-occurrence without being excused from performing one’s
own part of the deal. It was my contention that in the latter type of situation
the requirement of cooperation should be characterised as a potestative con
dition subsequent to P’s duty to perform.
Rather than imposing duties of cooperation, this approach makes use of
the concept of a burden. R has the discretionary power to cooperate with P
and hold him to his promise. He has a choice either to do it and fuifil hjs own
contractual expectations or not to do it and fail to earn his right to the servi-
ces he bargained for whilst stil being bound to pay the fuil contract price.
To put it another way, he is free to renounce the benefit of the contract, but he
must cooperate if he wishes to have it. It is as simple as that. However, at this
point another obstacle stood before me: the widespread beliefthat in order for
P to claim the fuli contract price he must earn it by actually performing his
part ofthe contract. It is this conception that lies behind the courts’ insistence
on safeguarding P’s alleged right to perform. His expectation to the fuil con
tract price would otherwise not be met.
•1 have found this to be a deceptive form of backward reasoning that does
not stand its ground once confronted with the product ofa purposive approach
to construction. It was my submission that in a large nurnber of cases P will
have no interest in actuaily performing his part of the contract beyond that of
reflexively securing his right to the fuil contract price. He wffl therefore not
have bargained for a right to perform, provided that right was not at stake.
If one takes a fresh and open-minded look at each particular factual situation
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one will undoubtedlly reach the conclusion that R wffl not always have com-
mitted himself to cooperate. If one also concludes that P did not take the risk
that R’s cooperation would not materialise what must logically follow is that
whenever R chooses not to act P must be released both from his duty to per
form and from the need to earn the right to the fuil contract price. There is no
other way of putting it.
The conditional approach to cooperation cannot provide R with an answer
to his problem in those cases where P happens to be able to complete his part
of the contract without R’s cooperation and even against his wilI. In Chapter
Three 1 tried to come up with an approach that would cover these cases as
well. II then struck me that the whole affair of cooperation and the Iack the
reof was in fact quite incidental to the situation under analysis, because if R
is entitled to bargain for a right to reject and even prevent P’s performance he
should be allowed to do so regardless of whether the latter happens to require
his cooperation in order to perform his part of the contract.
The problem with this assertion is that it must face an obstacle of consi
derable weight: in their obsession with the concept of repudiation, the courts
have yet failed to realise that there is here an entirely separate issue that
shouid be deait with by means other than the application of the doctrine of
anticipatory breach of contract. Ali through this dissertation 1 have argued
that prevention should not be auto.matically characterised as a breach of con
tract in the shape of a repudiation. At this stage 1 needed to add that even in
the presence of an unambiguous repudiation, insofar as the contract remains
in force the subject of R’s entitlement to reject and prevent P’s performance
must be handied as something entirely separate from that of the ineifective
ness of his attempted termination.
lndeed, just because R cannot be allowed to terminate the contract without
P’s assent it does not automatically follow that his conduct should be wholly
devoid of effect. As well as attempting to terminate the contract, R is letting P
know that he has lost all interest in the services he is about to provide. Those
two aspects of one and the sarne conduct are different and should therefore be
dealt with separately.
After having disposed of ali the misleading assumptions, however, it
becarne much clearer that the question that should be asked in any given fac-
tual situation is whether P has bargained for a right to perform. Where he
has not, he should not be allowed to wholly disregard R’s ioss of interest only
because he happens to be able to render his services without R’s cooperation.
Under those circurnstances R should be recognised both the right to
renounce the benefit of the contract and the power to prevent P from
attempting to perform his part of the contract rnerely by inforrning hirn
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of his renunciation.. 1 have called this purely conceptual remedy ‘prevention
by notification’.
Renouncing the benefit of a contract is something entirely different from
attempting to terminate it. It means forsaking what one has bargained for
whilst remaining bound to abide by one’s contractual duties. insofar as the
contract is still in force, therefore, R is still prima facie liable for the fuli con
tract price. In Chapter Four 1 have focused on the proposition that under these
circumstances R shoukl nonetheless not be made to pay the fuil contract price.
1 have contended that he should be aiowed to deduct from the contract price
whichever sums P has saved or otherwise made as a result of his early dis
charge, so that the latter does not end up better off than he would have been
had he duly performed his part of the contract. It is the general policy against
over-compensation at work.
1 have put forward that R should resort to the technical device of the tran
saction set-off and use it as a defence to P’s claim to the fuli contract price
made by way of an action in debt. This amounts to an application of the doc
trine of mitigation in fact. Even though there was no breach of contract pro
per, there is definitely an element of compensation in the claimant’s remedy
in that the award of the contract price is aimed at putting P in the position
he would have been in had he duly supplied his services to R, rather than at
rewarding him for the actual performance of those services. Therefore, the
expectation measure becomes reievant and so does the concept ofloss, or the
Iack thereof. Should P have gone ahead and supplied his services to R, wha
tever he failed to save must not be taken into account; it must not be charac
terised as constituting an expense in any way related to performance of his
contractual obligations. Moreover, where his conduct in attempting to cper
form’ is detrimental, he should have to compensate R for any loss his ‘per
formance’ might have caused him.
It is my belief that a contracting party who decides to reject the benefit of
the contract because he is no longer interested in the other party’s perfor
mance would greatly benefit from a more nuanced understanding of the
action for the agreed contract price. Such an approach would enable the
courts to look beyond the existence of a claim in debt and take due notice of
the relative interests of the parties to the contract, in order to arrive at a
solution that provides each of them with the levei of protection that matches
their needs. The suggestion for an alternative outlook on the situation under
scrutiny has not been made just for the sake of argument, rather it was offe
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